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Abstract
We consider incentive compatible mechanisms for a domain that is very close to the
domain of scheduling n unrelated machines: the single exception is that the valuation of just
one machine is submodular. For the scheduling problem with such cost functions, we give
a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) on the approximation ratio of incentive compatible deterministic
mechanisms. This is a strong information-theoretic impossibility result on the approximation
ratio of mechanisms on relatively simple domains. The lower bound of the current work
assumes no restriction on the mechanism side, but an expanded class of valuations, in
contrast to previous general results on the Nisan-Ronen conjecture that hold for only special
classes of mechanisms such as local, strongly monotone, and anonymous mechanisms. Our
approach is based on a novel characterization of appropriately selected smaller instances
that allows us to focus on particular type of algorithms (linear mechanisms), from which we
extract a locality property that gives the lower bound.
1 Introduction
The design of protocols that provide appropriate incentives to participants, entice them to
cooperate, and behave in a way which is socially beneficial has a long and celebrated history.
It is the realm of mechanism design which is one of the most researched branches of Game
Theory and Microeconomics. It studies the design of algorithms, called mechanisms, and it has
numerous applications to many situations in modern societies, whenever a protocol of conduct
of selfish participants is required. The mechanism asks each participant to bid their preferences
over the different social outcomes, and implements one of them (e.g. the one which is most
socially beneficial). The challenge is that the preferences of the participants are private, and they
are either unmotivated to report correctly, or strongly motivated to report them erroneously, if
a false report is profitable. A truthful mechanism provides incentives in a way that it is in the
best interest of each participant to bid truthfully.
The algorithmic nature of mechanism design and the associated computational issues, were
brought to light, in the seminal 20-year-old paper by Nisan and Ronen [31], which essentially
established the area of algorithmic mechanism design. They proposed the scheduling problem
on unrelated machines, a fundamental, extensively studied from the algorithmic perspective,
optimization problem as a representative specimen to study the limitations of truthful mech-
anisms. The objective is to incentivize n machines to execute m tasks, so that the maximum
completion time of the machines, i.e. the makespan, is minimized.
Nisan and Ronen applied the famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [33, 12,
21] which is a general machinery that truthfully computes the outcome that maximizes the
social welfare, which for the case of scheduling is the allocation that minimizes the sum of
completion times. The VCG is truthful and polynomial-time for scheduling, but with respect
to the makespan minimization it has a rather poor approximation ratio, equal to the number
of machines n. Despite this, they conjectured that the VCG is the mechanism with the best
approximation ratio for this problem.
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Conjecture 1. There is no deterministic truthful mechanism with approximation ratio better
than n for the problem of scheduling n unrelated machines.
The bound in the conjecture is information-theoretic, in the sense that it should hold for all
mechanisms (algorithms), polynomial-time or not. The Nisan-Ronen conjecture developed into
one of the central problems in Algorithmic Game Theory, and despite intensive efforts only very
sparse progress has been made towards its resolution. The original Nisan-Ronen paper showed
that no truthful deterministic mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than 2.
This was improved to 2.41 [10], and later to 2.61 [23], which leaves a huge gap with the known
upper bound of n. The most general and interesting result, by Ashlagi et al.[3], resolved a
restricted version of the conjecture, for the special yet natural class of anonymous mechanisms.
However, the original conjecture (for non-anonymous mechanisms) is widely open.
The original conjecture was posed for the case of additive valuations, where the total cost
of each machine equals the sum of its individual costs of each task. However, many mechanism
design settings consider more general valuations such as submodular, subadditive etc. In these
valuations, the cost of a machine that takes a set of tasks S is a function of S that satisfies some
natural properties. For example, for subadditive valuations the cost of a bundle of tasks S can
be any value bounded above by the sum of the cost of the individual tasks in S. This extended
domain may affect significantly the incentive compatibility aspect of mechanisms because it
allows a machine to also lie about the cost of bundles of tasks.
It is natural to pose the Nisan-Ronen question for these extended valuation classes. Despite
the importance of the problem and various attempts, the conjecture has been widely open for all
of them. In this work, we consider submodular cost functions, where the marginal contribution
of a task to the total cost of a machine is a non-increasing function. The class of submodular
valuations contains all additive valuations, it is a proper subject of subadditive valuations, and it
is one of the most restrictive natural valuations for the scheduling question. Furthermore it is the
most-studied class of valuations for the corresponding maximization problem of combinatorial
auctions (see for example [25, 18, 15]).
1.1 Our result
We give the first non-constant lower bound that works for all deterministic truthful mechanisms
when the cost functions are submodular.
Theorem 1. There is no deterministic truthful mechanism with approximation ratio better than√
n− 1 for the problem of scheduling n unrelated machines with submodular cost functions.
Actually we show a stronger result: Let M be the class of scheduling mechanisms which
are deterministic and truthful when all machines are additive except for one machine, which is
submodular. Then no mechanism in M has an approximation ratio better than √n− 1 on the
set of instances of scheduling unrelated additive machines.
The lower bound of the current work assumes no restriction on the mechanism side, but an
expanded class of valuations. In contrast, the Nisan-Ronen conjecture has been shown to hold
for only special classes of mechanisms (local [31], strongly monotone [30], and anonymous [3]
mechanisms).
Other valuation classes: Actually we don’t anticipate any difficulty in translating, in fact
carbon-copying, our results to supermodular valuations; we will include the details in the final
version of the paper. Interestingly, the class of additive valuations of the original Nisan-Ronen
conjecture is exactly the intersection of submodular and supermodular valuations.
In fact, we provide a stronger version of our theorem by considering submodular functions
which are also -additive, in the sense that the execution time of a set of tasks is within an
arbitrarily small  from the sum of the execution times of its tasks (see Section 2 for a precise
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definition). An important feature of our lower bound construction is that the cost functions
of all machines are additive with the single exception of one machine which is submodular for
particular disjoint pairs of tasks.
1.2 Overview of the techniques
We provide an overview of our approach for the lower bound. We consider instances in which
every task has a fixed large value, practically infinite, for all except for two machines; one
of the two machines is always the submodular player (player 0). We can assume that these
tasks are allocated to one of the two machines, otherwise the approximation ratio is sufficiently
high. This restriction of the allocation to only two players per task, have been previously
used (e.g. [10, 23]). The main difference with previous approaches is that we use properties of
mechanisms that involve at least three players, the submodular player and two other players.
Obtaining such multiplayer statements is the bottleneck for a complete characterization of
mechanisms in multiplayer domains.
Two-player characterization. We first focus on the tasks that can be allocated to a par-
ticular additive player and fix the values of the remaining tasks. For each additive player, there
are only two such tasks, and the situation is very similar to two-player and two-task special case
in which the valuation of one player is submodular. A core part of our proof, which is also of
independent interest, is a characterization of the allocation functions of all truthful mechanisms
for this case.
We provide a complete characterization for the case of two players with submodular valu-
ations which are non-negative and are bounded above by a constant. This is essential in our
construction to guarantee that the fixed large value of the other machines does not play any
role. Since this is a minimization problem, it is the lower bound (i.e., the restriction that the
values are non-negative) that creates complications rather then the upper bound on the domain.
We also provide a characterization for additive valuations, the actual scheduling domain.
We note that similar two-player characterizations have been provided by previous work
[17, 9], for auctions and scheduling domains, but none of these can be used in our approach. In
particular, the characterization of [17] for scheduling relies extensively on the bounded approx-
imation for two players, but we need a characterization without this assumption. The reason
is that the approximation ratio of any two players is in general unrelated to the approximation
ratio of the whole multi-player instance. In the same work, a characterization for auctions with
subadditive valuations is provided, but this is also of no use to the minimization we consider
here. Finally, the characterization of [9] cannot be used because it allows negative values.
Indeed, as we show in Section 3, the scheduling domain admits truthful mechanisms not
present in the previous characterizations of [17, 9], which we call relaxed affine minimizers.
Such mechanisms are essentially affine minimizers for large values, but they can have non-linear
boundaries for small values (see Definition 5 and Figure 2).
Gluing two-player mechanisms to multi-player linear mechanisms. From the char-
acterization of two-payer two-task mechanisms and using the fact that we are interested in
mechanisms with small approximation ratio for the whole multi-player instances, we are able to
exclude all mechanisms except of those that have affine boundaries (Lemma 3), that is, affine
minimizers whose coefficients may depend on the values of the other tasks.
One of the main technical steps is that we use the truthfulness of the submodular player
to show that the scaling coefficient of these linear mechanisms do not actually depend on the
values of the other tasks (Lemma 4). The rest of the proof, which includes the most complicated
technical steps of this work, is to analyze the properties of truthful linear algorithms that
facilitate the proof of the lower bound (Lemma 6).
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1.3 Related work
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines is a typical multi-dimensional mechanism design
problem. In multi-dimensional mechanism design, the valuation of each player for different
outcomes is expressed via a vector (one value for every outcome). In the case of unrelated
scheduling, this vector expresses the processing times of a machine for each subset of tasks and
can be succinctly represented by an m-valued vector, one value for each task.
An interesting special case, which is well-understood, is the single-dimensional mechanism
design in which the values of the vector are linear expressions of a single parameter. The
principal representative is the problem of scheduling related machines, where the cost of each
machine can be expressed via a single parameter, its speed. This was first studied by Archer
and Tardos [2] who showed that, in contrast to the unrelated machines version, an algorithm
that minimizes the makespan can be truthfully implemented — albeit in exponential time.
It was subsequently shown that truthfulness has essentially no impact on the computational
complexity of the problem. Specifically, a randomized truthful-in-expectation1 PTAS was given
in [14] and a deterministic PTAS was given in [11]; a PTAS is the best possible algorithm even
for the pure algorithmic problem (unless P = NP ).
The main obstacle in resolving the Nisan-Ronen conjecture is the lack of clear algorithmic
understanding of truthfulness for many players in multi-dimensional domains. In contrast, we
understand better truthfulness for a single player. Saks and Yu [32] gave a nice, complete char-
acterization of deterministic truthful mechanisms for convex domains which was later extended
to truthful-in-expectation randomized mechanisms in [1]. This characterization states that the
class of allocations of truthful mechanisms is the class of weakly monotone algorithms [5]. This
is an elegant characterization, but it has not been proved very useful for mechanisms of many
players, because it is difficult to combine monotonicity of each individual player into a single
global condition. Its direct applications have provided only constant bounds for makespan min-
imization [10, 30, 23, 31]. What would be more useful is a characterization similar to the one
provided by the seminal work of Roberts [22] for unrestricted domains. It essentially states that
the only truthful mechanisms are affine extensions of VCG. Similar characterizations have been
provided in [9, 17, 16] for settings with only two players. Extending these characterizations to
multiple players for scheduling and combinatorial auctions is notoriously hard, mainly due to
lack of externalities in these settings: the valuation of a player for an allocation depends only on
the subset of tasks it receives and is indifferent on how the remaining of the tasks are assigned
to the other players2.
Scheduling is related to combinatorial auctions, where multiple items need to be assigned to
a set of buyers. This is a broad and successful area, and the setting shares both aforementioned
features of multi-dimensionality and lack of externalities, therefore insights and techniques can
be transferred from the one problem to the other. However the difference is that the objective
for combinatorial auctions is social welfare maximization, and this is known to be achieved by
the VCG mechanism, albeit in exponential time. Hence the focus on this rich area is on what
can be achieved by computationally efficient mechanisms (see for example [18]). But in the case
of the scheduling with the min-max objective, the flavor is more information theoretic, as we
know that not even exponential time mechanisms can achieve the optimal makespan.
1.3.1 Further related work
Lavi and Swamy [24] proposed an interesting approach to attack the Nisan-Ronen question, by
restricting the input domain, but still keep the multi-dimensional flavour of the setting. They
1This is one of the two main definitions of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, where truth-telling
maximizes the expected utility of each player.
2For two players, there exist implicit externalities as the tasks one player doesn’t get determine what the other
player gets.
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assumed that each entry in the input matrix can take only two possible values “low” and “high”,
that are publicly known to the designer. In this case, they showed an elegant deterministic
mechanism with an approximation factor of 2. Surprisingly, even for this special case there is a
lower bound of 11/10. Yu [34] extended the results for a range of values, and Auletta et al. [4]
studied multi-dimensional domains where the private information of the machines is a single
bit.
Randomization has been explored and slightly improved the known guarantees. There are
two notions of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms. A mechanism is universally truthful
if it is defined as a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms, while it is
truthful-in-expectation, if in expectation no player can benefit by lying. In [31], a universally
truthful mechanism was proposed for the case of two machines, and was later extended to the
case of n machines by Mu’alem and Schapira [30] with an approximation guarantee of 0.875n,
which was later improved to 0.837n by [28]. Lu and Yu [29] showed a truthful-in-expectation
mechanism with an approximation guarantee of (m+ 5)/2. Mu’alem and Schapira [30], showed
a lower bound of 2 − 1/m, for both notions of randomization. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias
and Kova´cs [8] extended the lower bound for fractional mechanisms, where each task can be
fractionally allocated to multiple machines. They also showed a fractional mechanism with a
guarantee of (m + 1)/2. A sequence of papers studied randomized mechanisms for the special
case of two machines [27, 29] where a tight answer on the approximation factor is still unresolved.
Currently, the best upper bound is 1.587 due to Chen, Du, and Zuluaga [7].
The truthful implementation of other objectives have been explored by Mu’alem and Schapi-
ra [30] for multi-dimensional problems and by Epstein and van Stee [19] for single-dimensional
ones, giving a PTAS for a wide range of objective functions. Leucci, Mamageishvili and
Penna [26] showed high lower bounds for other min-max objectives on some combinatorial opti-
mization problems. In the Bayesian setting, Daskalakis and Weinberg [13] showed a mechanism
that is at most a factor of 2 from the optimal truthful mechanism, but not with respect to optimal
makespan. Chawla et al. [6] provided bounds of prior-independent mechanisms (where the input
comes from a probability unknown to the mechanism). Giannakopoulos and Kyropoulou [20]
showed that the VCG mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of O(log n/ log log n) under
some distributional and symmetry assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
There is a set N of n machines and a set M of m tasks that need to be scheduled on the
machines. The processing time or cost that each machine i takes to process a subset S of tasks
is described by a set function ti : 2
m → R≥0. In classic unrelated machines scheduling, the cost
functions are additive and the objective is to minimize the makespan (min-max objective).
We also consider more general cost functions that are normalized (ti(∅) = 0) and monotone
(ti(S) ≤ ti(T ) for S ⊆ T ). We focus on submodular cost functions, which satisfy the following
condition for every S, T ⊆M
ti(S ∪ T ) + ti(S ∩ T ) ≤ ti(S) + ti(T ).
In the classical Nisan-Ronen model, the cost functions are additive. In our lower bound
construction, we will assume that all cost functions are additive except for one which is sub-
modular. We also consider valuations which are arbitrarily close to additive, which we call
-additive, such that for every subset S,
∑
j∈S(ti({j})) −  ≤ ti(S) ≤
∑
j∈S(ti({j})) + . Our
results hold for valuations that are both submodular and -additive—even for valuations within
an  multiplicative factor from additive.
Mechanism design setting. We assume that each machine i ∈ N is controlled by a selfish
agent that is reluctant to process the tasks and the cost function ti is private information known
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only to her (also called the type of agent i). In the most general version of the problem, the set
Ti of possible types of agent i consists of all vectors bi ∈ R2m+ . Let also T = ×i∈NTi be the space
of type profiles.
A mechanism defines for each player i a set Bi of available strategies, the player (agent) can
choose from. We will consider direct revelation mechanisms, i.e., Bi = Ti for all i, meaning that
the players strategies are to simply report their types to the mechanism. A player may report
a false cost function bi 6= ti, if this serves her interests.
A mechanism (A,P ) consists of two parts:
An allocation algorithm: The allocation algorithm A allocates the jobs to the machines
depending on the players’ bids b = (b1, . . . , bn). Let A be the set of all possible partitions
of m tasks to n machines. The allocation function A : T → A partitions the tasks into
the n machines; we denote by Ai(b) the subset of tasks assigned to machine i in the bid
profile b.
A payment scheme: The payment scheme P = (P1, . . . , Pn) determines the payments also
depending on the bid values b. The functions P1, . . . , Pn stand for the payments that the
mechanism hands to each agent i.e. Pi : T → R.
The utility ui of a player i is the payment that he gets minus the actual time that he needs
to process the set of tasks assigned to her, ui(b) = Pi(b)−ti(Ai(b)). We are interested in truthful
mechanisms. A mechanism is truthful, if for every player, reporting his true type is a dominant
strategy. Formally,
ui(ti, b−i) ≥ ui(t′i, b−i), ∀i ∈ [n], ti, t′i ∈ Ti, b−i ∈ T−i,
where T−i denotes the possible types of all players disregarding i.
We use as an objective to evaluate the performance of a mechanism’s allocation algorithm
the makespan, that is the maximum completion time of a machine. The makespan of the
allocation algorithm A with respect to a given input t is
Mech(t)
def
= max
i∈N
ti(Ai(t)).
We aim at minimizing the makespan, hence the optimum is
Opt(t) = min
A∈A
max
i∈N
ti(Ai).
We are interested in the approximation ratio of the mechanism’s allocation algorithm. A mech-
anism M is c-approximate, if the allocation algorithm is c-approximate, that is, if c ≥ Mech(t)Opt(t)
for all possible inputs t.
We are looking for truthful mechanisms with low approximation ratio irrespective of the
running time to compute A and P. In other words, our lower bounds do not make use of any
computational assumptions.
Weak monotonicity. A useful characterization of truthful mechanisms in terms of the fol-
lowing monotonicity condition, helps us to get rid of the payments and focus on the properties
of the allocation algorithm.
Definition 1. An allocation algorithm A is called weakly monotone (WMON) if it satisfies the
following property: for every two inputs t = (ti, t−i) and t′ = (t′i, t−i), the associated allocations
A and A′ satisfy
ti(Ai)− ti(A′i) ≤ t′i(Ai)− t′i(A′i).
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It is well known that the allocation function of every truthful mechanism is WMON [5], and
also that this is a sufficient condition for truthfulness in convex domains [32].
A useful tool in our proof relies on the following immediate consequence of WMON, which
holds in additive domains as well as in the other domains that we consider. Intuitively, it states
that when you fix the values of all players for a subset of tasks (focus on a cut of your domain),
then the restriction of the allocation to the rest of the tasks must remain weakly monotone.
Lemma 1. Let A be a WMON allocation. Let us fix an (S, T ) partition of M , and consider
only valuations ti of player i that are additive across S and T , i.e., for every X ⊆M , ti(X) =
ti(X ∩ S) + ti(X ∩ T ). Then the restriction of the allocation A on S is weakly monotone for
each valuation fixed on the subsets of T.
Proof. A is weakly monotone, therefore
ti(Ai)− t′i(Ai) ≤ ti(A′i)− t′i(A′i),
and additivity across S and T implies
ti(Ai ∩ S)− t′i(Ai ∩ S) ≤ ti(A′i ∩ S)− t′i(A′i ∩ S),
as the values of subsets of T are fixed, ti(Ai ∩ T ) = t′i(Ai ∩ T ) and ti(A′i ∩ T ) = t′i(A′i ∩ T ).
The following lemma was essentially shown in [31] and has been a useful tool to show lower
bounds for truthful mechanisms for several variants (see for example [10, 30, 3]). Although this
holds more generally, we only state it (and use it in Section 4) for additive valuations.
Lemma 2. Let t be a bid vector of additive valuations, and let S = Ai(t) be the subset assigned
to player i by the mechanism. For any bid vector t′ = (t′i, t−i) such that only the bid of machine
i has changed and in such a way that for every task in S it has decreased (i.e., t′i({j}) <
ti({j}), j ∈ S) and for every other task it has increased (i.e., t′i({j}) > ti({j}), j ∈ M \ S).
Then the mechanism does not change the allocation to machine i, i.e., Ai(t
′) = Ai(t) = S.
The main challenge in multi-player settings is that the allocation of the other machines may
change and the above condition makes no promise about how this can happen.
3 Characterization for two players
A core element of our lower bound proof is a characterization of truthful mechanisms for two
tasks and two players (called t-player, and s-player). We first provide a characterization for
additive valuations t = (t1, t2), and s = (s1, s2), so that both s1 and s2 are bounded by
an arbitrarily large but fixed value B. Then we extend it when the t player has submodular
valuations t = (t1, t2, t12) (Theorem 2), which is the main element that we need in the lower
bound in Section 4. We note that both the characterization and the lower bound result hold
analogously when the t-player has arbitrary monotone, or -additive (or submodular and -
additive) valuations.
We postpone the details of the characterization proof to the Appendix, but in this section
we introduce the definitions that we will need in order to state the main result and also to
introduce some notation which will be used in our lower bound proof in Section 4. We keep in
the Appendix intact the whole proof of the characterization.
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Figure 1: The allocation A[s] to the t-player depending on his own bid vector (t1, t2) :
(a) quasi-bundling allocation; (b) quasi-flipping allocation; (c) crossing allocation. The interiors
of some regions might be empty, but R∅ 6= ∅ can be assumed w.l.o.g. We marked the functions
of critical values ψ(t2, s) (Definition 7) for receiving task 1 by broken lines.
3.1 Basic Definitions
Let (A,P ) be a truthful mechanism, where A is the WMON allocation function, and P denotes
the payment function. For input (t, s) the allocation is A(t, s). Since we have only tasks 1 and
2, in A(t, s) we can denote the allocation to one of the players as αt, αs ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}.
For given s ∈ [0, B) × [0, B) the allocation for the t-player as function of his own bids
(t1, t2) (or (t1, t2, t12)) is denoted by A[s], and symmetrically A[t] is an allocation function for
the s-player. For αt ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}, the allocation regions Rαt(s) ⊆ R2≥0 (resp. R3≥0) of A[s] are
defined to be the interior (wrt. R2≥0) of the set of all t values such that A(t, s) = αt. For the
s-player we denote the respective regions by Rsαs(t).
Additive players It is known that in the case of two tasks, the regions in a WMON allocation
subdivide R2≥0 basically in three possible forms, which are characteristic for the type of the whole
allocation-function A (see Figure 1). The regions and their boundaries determine the critical
values for t1 (as function of t2 ) above which the t-player cannot get task 1, and symmetrically
for task 2. These critical value functions are determined by the payment functions P∅(s) =
0, P1(s), P2(s), P12(s) for the fixed s.
Definition 2. For given s, we call the allocation A[s]
• quasi-bundling, if there are at least two points t 6= t′ on the boundary of R12 and R∅
• quasi-flipping, if there are at least two points t 6= t′ on the boundary of R1 and R2
• crossing otherwise (see Figure 1).
3.2 Mechanisms for submodular players
We now introduce the types of WMON allocations that can occur when the t-player is sub-
modular and the s-player is additive and bounded above by the value B. We denote these
particular domains Tt×Ts for two players and two tasks by Vsubmod ×V+,B, and refer the reader
to the appendix Section A for detailed definitions, and also for extension of our results to other
domains. We assume that there always exist high enough t values so that the t-player receives
no task, i.e., that R∅(s) 6= ∅ for every s.3
3This assumption is without loss of generality for mechanisms with finite approximation of the makespan,
even if some 2D cut mechanism of a WMON mechanism with more tasks and/or players is considered.
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1-dimensional mechanisms In a one-dimensional mechanism at most two possible alloca-
tions are ever realized. Due to the assumption on R∅, one of these must be the allocation ∅ to
the t-player. If the two occuring allocations (for the t-player) are ∅ and 12, we call the mecha-
nism bundling mechanism. The other cases when the allocations to the t-player are ∅ and 1 (or
∅ and 2) are degenerate task-independent allocations, and can be defined similarly to bundling
mechanisms.
Definition 3. In a bundling mechanism only the allocations ∅ and 12 can occur. There is an
arbitrary, increasing4 function ξ : [0, B) → [0,∞) so that if t12 > ξ(s1 + s2) then the t-player
gets ∅, and if t12 < ξ(s1 + s2) then the t-player gets 12.
If ξ has a jump discontinuity in some point s1+s2 then the critical value may depend on the
concrete (s1, s2) with the given fixed sum, as long as it is between ξ((s1+s2)
−) and ξ((s1+s2)+).
Relaxed affine minimizers
Definition 4. An allocation A is an affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants per player
µt and µs, and constants γα ∈ R∪{−∞,∞} per allocation (say, here α = αt), so that for every
input (t, s) the allocation A(t, s) minimizes over
µtt12 + γ12, µtt1 + µss2 + γ1, µss1 + µtt2 + γ2, µs(s1 + s2) + γ∅.
Definition 5. An allocation A is a relaxed affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants per
player µt and µs, and constants γα per allocation α (of the t-player), furthermore an arbitrary
increasing function ξ : [0,min(γ1, γ2) − γ∅) → [0,∞) (if the interval [0,min(γ1, γ2) − γ∅) is
nonempty) with min(γ1, γ2)− γ12 = ξ(min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅), so that for every input (t, s)
a) if µs · (s1 + s2) ≥ min(γ1, γ2)−γ∅, the allocation A(t, s) is that of an affine minimizer with
the given constants
b) if µs · (s1 + s2) ≤ min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅, then if µt · t12 > ξ(µs(s1 + s2)) then the allocation for
the t-player is ∅ and if µt · t12 < ξ(µs · (s1 + s2)) then it is 12.
The boundary conditions in the above definition are such that the affine minimizer part
(a) fits with the bundling mechanism part (b) and the resulting mechanism is truthful. See
Figure 2, for an example of such a mechanism in the additive domain.
Constant mechanisms In a constant mechanism the allocation is independent of the bids of
at least one of the players. This property can also be interpreted as being an affine minimizer
with multiplicative constant µ = 0. Due to the assumption on R∅ we only need to consider
constant mechanisms that are independent (at least) of the s-player.
3.3 The main characterization result
The characterization that we use for the lower bound is captured by the following theorem,
whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Every WMON allocation for two tasks and two players with bids t ∈ Vsubmod
and s ∈ V+,B, where both tasks are always allocated, and R∅(s) 6= ∅ for every s, is one of
these three types: (1) relaxed affine minimizer, (2) one-dimensional mechanism, or (3) constant
mechanism.
In the Appendix we show that the same characterization (and hence our lower bound) holds
for WMON allocations for various domains of valuations of the t-player and in particular for
submodular valuations which are arbitrarily close to additive, which we denote by V ∩Vsubmod .
4Throughout the paper, by ’increasing’ we mean ’non-decreasing’; otherwise we say ’strictly increasing’.
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s1s1 − 1
s2 − 1
√
s1 + s2
√
s1 + s2
Figure 2: An example of a relaxed affine minimizer, which shows the allocation of the t-player.
The solid lines show the boundaries of the allocations for values of the s-player when s1+s2 ≥ 1.
The dashed lines show the allocation boundary when s1 + s2 < 1. Sometimes we refer to this
part of relaxed affine minimizers as “bundling tail”.
4 Lower Bound
In this section, we give a proof of our main theorem (Theorem 1). First in Section 4.1 we
describe the domain of instances that we use, and in Section 4.2 we use the characterization for
two machines and two tasks (Theorem 2) to establish that the only interesting mechanisms are
linear (see the subsection for a precise definition), then in Section 4.3 we explore the linearity
property of mechanisms with bounded approximation ratio to establish some useful locality
lemmas that are eventually used in Section 4.4 to complete the proof.
4.1 The construction
To prove the lower bound, we focus on the domain of 2(n − 1) tasks and n players. Player 0
is special and for convenience we use the symbol t for its values; sometimes we refer to it as
the t-player. We use the symbol s for the values of the remaining players 1, . . . , n − 1, and
sometimes we refer to them as the s-players.
The set of tasks M = {1, 1′, 2, 2′, . . . , n − 1, (n − 1)′} is partitioned in pairs and each pair
{i, i′} is associated with player i, i = 1, . . . , n− 1. We call the two tasks of each pair {i, i′} twin
tasks.
Let vi(S) denote the cost (valuation) of player i when it takes the subset S ⊆M of tasks.
• the cost of the s-players is additive: vi(S) is additive for i ≥ 1.
• the cost of the s-players for tasks not in their associated pair is a sufficiently large fixed
constant Θ 4n2: for distinct i, j ≥ 1, vi({j}) = vi({j′}) = Θ.
• the cost of the t-player for twin tasks is submodular: for every i = 1, . . . , n − 1, the
restriction of v0(S) to S ⊆ {i, i′}) is submodular.
• the cost of the t-player is additive across pairs: v0(S) =
∑n−1
i=1 v0(S ∩ {i, i′}). Therefore
v0(S) is submodular, as the sum of submodular functions.
To simplify the notation we will denote an instance that satisfies the above conditions by
(ti, si, ti′ , si′ , ti,i′)
n−1
i=1 , (1)
where
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• si and si′ the cost of i-th s-player for the tasks in its associated pair {i, i′}
• ti and ti′ the cost of the t-player when it takes only one of the twin tasks {i, i′}
• ti,i′ the cost of the t-player when it takes both twin tasks {i, i′}
With the exception of costs ti,i′ an instance is captured by the following matrix indexed by
players and tasks, which shows the cost of each when a player gets no other task.
t1 t1′ t2 t2′ · · · tn−1 t(n−1)′
s1 s1′ Θ Θ · · · Θ Θ
Θ Θ s2 s2′ · · · Θ Θ
...
Θ Θ Θ Θ · · · sn−1 s(n−1)′
 .
If the valuations of all players were additive, this matrix would be sufficient to determine the
cost for all bundles. The instances we consider have more general cost functions and include
the submodular valuation of twin tasks for the t-player. Since for two tasks, a function is
submodular if and only if it is subadditive, values ti,i′ satisfy
ti,i′ ≤ ti + ti′ .
It is useful to think of the value Θ as practically infinite, since it is much larger that the
other values. On the other hand, to prove our main theorem in its generality, we need this value
to be finite and this complicates the characterization of truthful mechanisms.
We focus on instances that satisfy si ∈ [0, 1], si′ = n, ti′ = 0, ti,i′ = ti + ti′ for all i ∈ [n− 1].
Note the subtlety here: while the domain contains instances with ti,i′ ≤ ti + ti′ , for the proof of
the lower bound, we consider the subclass of additive instances. This should not be surprising
in the sense that lower bound proofs usually employ a subclass of instances. Still, it raises the
question whether we could carry out the same proof in the additive domain. The answer is
negative, because the sets of mechanisms for additive and submodular (subadditive) domains
for two tasks are different; for example, task-independent mechanisms are not truthful for
submodular domains.
Definition 6 (Restricted (t, s) instance). Instances of the form (ti, si, ti′ , si′ , ti,i′)
n−1
i=1 (Equa-
tion 1) that satisfy
si ∈ [0, 1], si′ = n, ti′ = 0, ti,i′ = ti + ti′ , for all i ∈ [n− 1], (2)
(t, s) = ((ti)
n−1
i=1 , (si)
n−1
i=1 )
will be called restricted (t, s) instances.
Note that, unlike the other values, the ti values can be arbitrarily high. This will be useful
later (Lemma 3). Note also that the optimum makespan of every restricted instance is at most
1. For these instances, any algorithm with approximation ratio less than n, must allocate all
the i′ tasks to the t-player and every i task either to the associated si-player or the t-player.
4.2 From affine minimizers for twin tasks to linear mechanisms
In this section, we use the characterization of mechanisms (Theorem 2) for each pair of twin
tasks in an instance (ti, si, ti′ , si′ , ti,i′)
n−1
i=1 , to derive an essential property of mechanisms for
the restricted (t, s) instances. By the characterization, there are mechanisms of twin tasks, such
as the one-dimensional, constant, or bundling tails of relaxed affine minimizers, that may have
non-affine boundaries between different allocations. In this section, we show that mechanisms
with non-affine boundaries are also excluded, when we additionally require that the mechanisms
have small approximation ratio—on whole instances, not just on a pair of twin tasks.
First we define the notion of boundaries that we consider in proof of the lower bound.
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Definition 7. For a given allocation algorithm, considered on restricted (t, s) instances, we call
ψi(si, s−i, t−i) a critical value or boundary if the t-player receives task i when ti < ψi(si, s−i, t−i),
and does not receive task i when ti > ψi(si, s−i, t−i) (for example in Figure 1, ψ1 is shown with
dashed lines).
We claim below that a truthful allocation with a reasonable approximation ratio (say, of at
most n) for the restricted (t, s) instances satisfies the following important property:
Definition 8 (Linear mechanisms). An allocation algorithm for the restricted (t, s) instances
(Equation 2), is called linear if the critical values for task i, i = 1, . . . , n−1 are truncated affine
functions in si. In particular when
ψi(si, s−i, t−i) = max(0, λi(s−i, t−i) si + γi(s−i, t−i)),
for some λi(s−i, t−i) > 0. We call a mechanism linear, if it uses a linear allocation algorithm.
Lemma 3. A mechanism for the instances (ti, si, ti′ , si′ , ti,i′)
n−1
i=1 (Equation 1) with approxi-
mation ratio less than n must be linear for the restricted (t, s) instances.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the restriction of the mechanism for the twin tasks i, i′ is weakly mono-
tone, and therefore by the characterization theorem (Theorem 2), it is either a relaxed affine
minimizer, a one-dimensional, or a constant mechanism. We will show that if the approximation
ratio is less than n, the mechanism cannot be one-dimensional, constant, or even relaxed affine
minimizer with a bundling tail. The reason is that algorithms in all these cases are so inefficient
that their makespan only for these two tasks is large enough to show a large approximation
ratio for the entire instance.
Let’s first argue that it cannot be a one-dimensional or a constant mechanism. We fix all
values of the other tasks as in restricted instances. By Lemma B.3.6, there are values for the
twin tasks i, i′ for which the algorithm has makespan µ ≥ √Θ and approximation ratio at least√
Θ. Since the optimal makespan of the other tasks of a restricted instance is at most 1, the
approximation ratio is at least µ/(1 + µ/
√
Θ) ≥ √Θ/2 ≥ n.
As a result, the restriction to twin tasks i, i′ is a relaxed affine minimizer. We now argue
that there should be no bundling part of the relaxed affine minimizer when the approximation
ratio is less than n. Let us fix the values sj ∈ [0, 1], sj′ = n for all j ∈ [n − 1], and the values
t′j = 0, tj,j′ = tj + tj′ for all j 6= i. We observe that the restriction of the mechanism in the cut
t−{i,i′} (the 2-dimensional partition when we also fix all other values except ti and t′i) should
definitely contain an area where the t-player gets task i′ but not i (in particular, when ti′ = δ,
for some arbitrarily small δ, and ti is very large). Otherwise the mechanism has approximation
ratio at least n.
This shows that in the domain of restricted (t, s) instances, the mechanisms with approx-
imation ratio less than n are affine minimizers in every cut of pairs of twin tasks (even if in
general, that is, for si′ < n they are relaxed affine minimizers). Therefore, the only mechanisms
with approximation ratio less than n are linear for the restricted (s, t) instances.
4.3 Linearity
From now on we focus on linear truthful mechanisms for restricted (t, s) instances. Establishing
linearity of the boundaries (Lemma 3) is not directly useful, because the linear coefficient of
the boundary i may depend on the other values of t. The next lemma shows that this is not
the case for the scaling factor λi, although the γi term may still depend on the other values of
t. Its proof is based on the interaction of pairs of tasks i and j. Note that these are not twin
tasks but involve at least three players, the t-player and the two associated s-players. Obtaining
such multiplayer statements is the bottleneck for a complete characterization of mechanisms in
multiplayer domains, and it is perhaps the most crucial part of the proof.
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Lemma 4. For fixed i and j, and for fixed s−i, t−ij, assume that ψi(si, s−i, t−i) is a trun-
cated linear function of si, i.e., ψi(si, s−i, t−i) = max(0, λi(s−i, t−i)si + γi(s−i, t−i)), for some
λi(s−i, t−i) ≥ 0. Then λi(s−i, t−i) is the same for all tj that satisfy ψi(si, s−i, t−i) > 0.
Proof. To keep the notation simple, we drop all values except for si and tj . Let K(si) = {tj :
ψi(si, tj) > 0} be the interval of interest. Note first that when we increase si, the interval of
interest can only expand, because ψi(si, tj) is non-decreasing in si.
Within interval K(si), function ψi(si, tj) is positive and therefore equal to λi(tj)si + γi(tj).
Furthermore, weak monotonicity implies that as a function of tj , ψi(si, tj) is a piecewise linear
function with derivative (slope) in {0, 1,−1} (see for example, Figure 1).
The piecewise linear function ψi(si, tj) is differentiable
5 everywhere except perhaps of the
at most two break points. We have
∂ψi(si, tj)
∂tj
=
∂λi(tj)
∂tj
si +
∂γi(tj)
∂tj
.
If ∂λi(tj)/∂tj 6= 0, then by varying si, the slope cannot stay in {0, 1,−1}. We conclude that
∂λi(tj)/∂tj = 0 in each piece, which shows that λi(tj) is independent of tj within each piece
and therefore independent of tj everywhere.
The following corollary is an essential tool for establishing the lower bound.
Corollary 1. The constant parts of the piecewise linear function ψi(si, s−i, t−i), as a function
of tj, are independent of sj, for j 6= i.
Proof. We fix all values except for tasks i and j. By the previous lemma, when we change sj ,
the boundary ψj(sj , s−j , t−j) is translated rectilinearly and therefore its break points remain
the same. Since the constant parts of ψi(si, s−i, t−i) are determined by the break points of
ψj(sj , s−j , t−j), they also remain the same. See Figure 3 for an illustration.
Corollary 2. The piecewise linear function ψi(si, s−i, t−i) is either non-decreasing in tj or
non-decreasing in sj.
Proof. When we fix all other values and consider the t−{i,j} cut, it is either quasi-flipping or
crossing, in which case ψi(si, s−i, t−i) is non-decreasing in tj , or quasi-bundling, in which case
2D geometry shows that it is non-decreasing in sj (when sj decreases the diagonal part shifts
downwards, and the rectilinear parts remain fixed). See Figure 3 for an illustration.
4.4 The main theorem
We now have most of the ingredients to prove next theorem which directly implies the main
lower bound Theorem 1).
Theorem 3. The approximation ratio of linear truthful algorithms on restricted (s, t) instances
(Equation 2) with n machines is at least
√
n− 1.
To prove this theorem, we fix some linear truthful algorithm and we focus on a particular
set of instances, which we call s-inefficient. The set of s-inefficient instances depends on the
linear algorithm and each instance consists of two types of tasks: either a task is unimportant
(i.e., it has very small value for one of the machines), or its s value is significantly higher than
its t value, yet the algorithm allocates the task to the s-player.
5It is not hard to see that if ψi(si, tj) is differentiable then so are λi(tj) and γi(tj); alternatively, one could
use small differences instead of derivatives.
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tj
ti
ψi(tj , sˆj)
ψj(tj , sˆj)ψj(tj , sj)
ψi(tj , sj)
Figure 3: Consider the dashed lines that show ψi(tj , sj) and ψj(tj , sj) (these functions may
depend on other values but they play no role and we can ingore them). The regular lines show
ψi(tj , sˆj) and ψj(tj , sˆj), for some sˆj > sj . Notice that linearity implies that ψi(tj , sˆj) is a shift to
the right of ψi(tj , sj); in particular, the break point stay at the same height. As a consequence,
the blue horizontal parts remain at the same height and the blue diagonal part shifts to the
right. Therefore ψi(tj , sˆj) ≥ ψi(tj , sj).
Definition 9 (s-inefficient instances). Let’s call a task i trivial when either si = 0 or ti ∈
(0, δ0], for some fixed (sufficiently small) δ0. We call a restricted (t, s) instance s-inefficient
for a mechanism, if it contains at least one non-trivial task, every non-trivial task i satisfies
si/ti >
√
n− 1, and the mechanism allocates all non-trivial tasks to the s-player.
The heart of the proof is to show that if the set of s-inefficient instances is non-empty, there
exists an s-inefficient instance with exactly one non-trivial task. From this, it immediately
follows that the algorithm has approximation ratio at least
√
n− 1.
However, it may be that for a given linear truthful algorithm there are no s-inefficient
instances. But then we can use weak monotonicity to easily derive a
√
n− 1 lower bound on
the approximation ratio as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5. If for a given truthful algorithm the set of s-inefficient instances is empty, then its
approximation ratio is at least
√
n− 1.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, consider an algorithm that has approximation ratio
√
n− 1−δ,
for some δ > 0, for which the set of s-inefficient instances is empty. We consider the instance
with ti = α = 1/
√
n− 1− δ/n and si = 1, for all i ∈ [n− 1].
α α · · · α
1
1
...
1
 (3)
Note that at least one task is allocated to the s-players, because if all tasks are assigned to the
t-player, the makespan is (n−1)α = √n− 1− (n−1)δ/n > √n− 1−δ, the optimum makespan
is 1, and the approximation ratio is strictly greater than
√
n− 1− δ.
Now for every task i which is allocated to the t-player, we lower its value from α to some
small value in (0, δ0] and increase the t value of every other task to α+ δ/(2n) < 1/
√
n− 1. By
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t1
t2
(t1, t2)
(t∗1, t2)
Figure 4: When the cut is quasiflipping and neither task is given to the t-player in the allocation
for (t1, t2), then the second task is still not allocated to the t-player in the allocation for (t1∗ ≈
0, t2).
weak monotonicity (Lemma 2), the allocation of the tasks for the t-player remains the same.
Since at least one task is allocated to the s-players, we end up with an s-inefficient instance, a
contradiction.
The proof of the next lemma (Lemma 6), which provides a very useful property of linear
mechanisms, is the most critical part of the proof. It shows that linear weakly monotone
algorithms satisfy a locality property, that bears some resemblance to the locality property
in [31]. But unlike [31], our proof does not assume this property, but it derives it from weak
monotonicity for the special class of instances that we consider.
Lemma 6. If for a given linear truthful algorithm the set of s-inefficient instances is non-empty,
then there is an s-inefficient instance with exactly one non-trivial task.
Proof. Fix a linear truthful algorithm and consider an s-inefficient instance (t, s) with the mini-
mum number of non-trivial tasks. If the number of non-trivial tasks is at least two, let us assume
without loss of generality that tasks 1 and 2 are non-trivial. We will derive a contradiction by
reducing the number of non-trivial tasks.
Consider the boundary function of the first task, ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) = max(0, λ1(s−1, t−1)s1 +
γ1(s−1, t−1), for some positive λ1. The crux of the matter is that we can reduce the value of s1
to 0 or t1 to at most δ0, and guarantee that the t-player will keep not getting the second task.
This guarantees that the second task is non-trivial and is given to the s-player, while the first
task becomes trivial.
If ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) as a function of t1 is non-decreasing (i.e., the t−{1,2} cut is quasi-flipping
or crossing), we set t∗1 ∈ (0, δ0]. Since ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) is non-decreasing in t1 (Corollary 2), in
the new instance the second task is still allocated to the s-player (Figure 4).
Otherwise (i.e., the t−{1,2} cut is quasi-bundling), by Corollary 1, function ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2)
is non-decreasing in s1. In this case, we change the instance as follows (see Figures 5 for an
illustration of the first two cases):
a) if γ1(s−1, t−1) ≥ 0, we set s∗1 = 0 and t∗1 = t1,
b) otherwise, if ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) > 0, we set s∗1 = −γ1(s−1, t−1)/λ1(s−1, t−1) and t∗1 ∈ (0, δ0],
small enough to make task 1 trivial,
c) and if ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) = 0, we set s∗1 = s1 and t∗1 ∈ (0, δ0], small enough to make task 1
trivial.
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ψ2(t1, s1)
ψ1(t2, s2)
(t1, t2)
ψ2(t1, s
∗
1 = 0)
t1
t2
ψ2(t1, s1)
ψ1(t2, s2)
(t1, t2)
(t∗1 ≈ 0, t2)
ψ2(t1, s
∗
1)
Figure 5: Left side case (a), when si∗ decreases to 0: the boundary ψ2(t1, s∗1) is lower than the
boundary ψ2(t1, s
∗
1). Both tasks are still allocated to the s-player. Right side case (b), when
the si decreases to s
∗
1 = −γ1(s−1, t−1)/λ1(s−1, t−1) and t1 changes to t∗1 ≈ 0. The new (t∗1, t2)
remains in the region in which both tasks are allocated to the s-player.
In the first two cases, we lower the s1 value to s
∗
1 until either s
∗
1 becomes 0 (case a), or
ψ1(s
∗
1, s−1, t−1) becomes 0 and then we set t1 = t1∗ ≈ 0 (case b). The third case is when
ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1) is already 0.
In all cases, the first task becomes a trivial task with the new values. Furthermore, in
all cases the new value of s1 is not greater than the original value: s
∗
1 ≤ s1. This is clearly
true in the first and third case. To see that this is true in the second case, observe that the
boundary ψ1(s1, s−1, t−1), which is a non-decreasing function on s1, moved from a positive value
to ψ1(s
∗
1, s−1, t−1) = 0.
We now argue that the second task is still given to the s-player after the change. The
argument is based on Corollary 1, which guarantees that the changes can only shift the boundary
ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) rectilinearly: in Figure 5, the slanted part moves only horizontally.
For case (a), by Corollary 1, the boundary ψ2(s2, s−2, t−2) did not increase and therefore
the second task is still given to the s-player (left part of Figure 5). For the other two cases,
this is not sufficient because t1 changed and therefore t−2 changed as well. For case (b), the
change shifts the slanted boundary (right part of Figure 5). In its new position, it crosses the
boundary of the positive orthant at (0, t2) which is dominated by the point (t
∗
1, t2). Therefore,
the t-player gets neither task, and shows that the s-player gets the second task. Case (c) is
simpler and similar to the second one; the difference is that the boundary starts at the leftmost
position and it does not move at all (in the right part of Figure 5, the solid and dashed lines
coincide and they may closer to the beginning of axes).
The change of values of the first task did not change the allocation of the second task, but
it may have changed the allocation of the remaining non-trivial tasks. But we can use weak
monotonicity to further change the instance to obtain an s-inefficient instance. If some non-
trivial tasks changed allocation and were given to the t player, we reduce their values to 0. This
will make them trivial tasks and, by weak monotonicity (Lemma 2), preserve the allocation of
the first player for the other non-trivial tasks6. The resulting instance is s-inefficient and has
fewer non-trivial tasks, a contradiction.
6Strictly speaking, to guarantee that the allocation remains the same for the non-trivial tasks, we need to
increase slightly their t value. This is possible without violating the constraint si/ti >
√
n− 1, which shows that
the resulting instance is also s-inefficient.
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The proof of the main result of this section follows directly from the last two lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 3. By the last two lemmas, either a linear truthful algorithm has approxi-
mation ratio at least
√
n− 1, or there exists an s-inefficient instance with one non-trivial task.
The approximation ratio of such an instance is trivially at least
√
n− 1, and the proof is com-
plete.
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Appendix: All truthful mechanisms for 2
tasks and 2 machines
A Additive valuations for 2 tasks and 2 machines
A.1 Basic concepts and notation
In this section we characterize WMON allocations for two tasks and two players (called t-player,
and s-player) with additive valuations t = (t1, t2), and s = (s1, s2), so that both s1 and s2 are
bounded by an arbitrarily large but fixed value B.
Let (A,P ) be a truthful mechanism, where A is the WMON allocation function, and P
denotes the payment function. For input (t, s) the allocation is A(t, s). Since we have only tasks
1 and 2, in A(t, s) we can denote the allocation to one of the players as αt, αs ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}. We
often abuse notation and identify A(t, s) by the allocation αt of the t-player; e.g., we say that
the allocation A(t, s) is 12, meaning that αt = 12, and αs = ∅.
For given s ∈ [0, B) × [0, B) the allocation for the t-player as function of his bids (t1, t2)
is denoted by A[s], and symmetrically A[t] is an allocation function for the s-player. For
αt ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}, the allocation regions Rαt(s) ⊆ R2≥0 of A[s] are defined to be the interior
(wrt. R2≥0) of the set of all t values such that A(t, s) = αt. (For the s-player we denote the
respective regions by Rsαs(t). ) We assume that for every s ∈ [0, B)× [0, B) there exist t values so
that the t-player receives no task, i.e., that R∅(s) 6= ∅ for every s. Note that we do not assume the
same for the s-player, because his bids are bounded. We remark that the assumption R∅(s) 6= ∅
does not restrict the types of possible WMON mechanisms, but it simplifies the characterization
to a large extent.
It is known that in the case of two tasks, the regions in a WMON allocation subdivide
R2≥0 basically in three possible forms, which will turn out to be characteristic for the type of
the whole allocation-function A. (see Figure 6) The regions and their boundaries determine the
critical values for t1 (in fact, as function of t2 ) above which the t-player cannot get task 1,
and symmetrically for task 2. These critical value functions are ultimately determined by the
payment functions P∅(s) = 0, P1(s), P2(s), P12(s) for the fixed s.
For any given s, we assume w.l.o.g. virtual payments for the t-player, which are the unique
normalized and monotone (as set functions) payments for a given allocation A[s] (see also
Section B):
Definition 10. Let (A, Pˆ ) be a truthful mechanism, and s = (s1, s2) be fixed. The payments
occuring in this definition are all defined for this given s, so we omit (s) from the notation. Since
R∅ 6= ∅, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the payment function Pˆ is normalized, that is, Pˆ∅ = 0. We
define the virtual payments as:
P∅ = 0,
P1 = max{Pˆ1, 0}, P2 = max{Pˆ2, 0},
P12 = max{Pˆ12, P1, P2}.
The virtual payments are always well-defined, non-negative, and truthful payments to the
t-player for the given allocation A[s].
For fixed s, the virtual payments determine uniquely the allocation and vice-versa. The
value P1 determines the position of the vertical boundary/critical value between R∅ and R1.
Since R∅ is nonempty, this boundary always exists; if R1 = ∅, then P1 = 0. Analogously, P2
is the position of the horizontal boundary between R∅ and R2; furthermore P12 − P2 (resp.
P12 − P1) is the position of the vertical (horizontal) boundary between R12 and R2 (resp. R12
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Figure 6: The allocations to a single player depending on his own 2-dimensional bid vector
partition the bid-space according to one of these three shapes (where the interior of some
region(s) different from R∅ may be empty). The allocation A[s] is called (a) crossing, (b)
quasi-flipping, or (c) quasi-bundling, respectively.
and R1) if these regions are nonempty. In the proof below, for given s we also use the short
notation
f ′ = P1, g′ = P2,
and if the respective boundary exists then also
f = P12 − P2, g = P12 − P1.
Definition 11. For given s, we call the allocation A[s]
• quasi-bundling, if there are at least two points t 6= t′ on the boundary of R12 and R∅(⇔
P1 < P12 − P2)
• quasi-flipping, if there are at least two points t 6= t′ on the boundary of R1 and R2
(⇔ P1 > P12 − P2).
• crossing otherwise ( ⇔ P1 = P12 − P2) (see also Figure 6)
Next we introduce the four different types of WMON allocations that can occur in the above
setting. After that we prove the characterization.7
A.1.1 Relaxed task-independent allocations
An allocation function A is task-independent if, for i ∈ {1, 2}, the allocation of task i depends
only on the input values si and ti. For the t-player, the critical-value of t1, i.e., the lowest
value, above which t1 does not get task 1, is determined by an arbitrary, increasing function
φ : [0, B) → [0,∞) of s1. Analogously we can define the critical-value function η(s2) as the
lowest value, depending on s2, above which t2 does not get task 2.
8 Geometrically, in a task-
independent mechanism, the allocations A[s] and A[t] of both players are always crossing. In a
relaxed task-independent mechanism the latter property is fulfilled in all but countably many s
(resp. t) points, in which both φ and η (resp. φ−1 and η−1) have a jump discontinuity:
Definition 12. An allocation is a relaxed task-independent allocation if there exist arbitrary,
increasing critical-value functions for the t-player: φ(s1) for task 1, and η(s2) for task 2, so that
for every s ∈ [0, B)× [0, B)
7Observe that there exist mechanisms that adhere to more than one of the given types.
8The tie-breaking (i.e., when e.g., t1 = φ(s1)) may in all cases depend on the other variables (s2 and t2) .
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– if φ() is continuous in the point s1 OR η() is continuous in the point s2 then the alloca-
tion of the two tasks is independent and adheres to the critical values φ(s1) and η(s2),
respectively; (note however that if, e.g., η has a jump discontinuity in s2, then the critical
value of for task 2 can depend on s1, as long as it is between η(s
−
2 ) and η(s
+
2 ));
– if φ() has a jump discontinuity in the point s1 AND η() has a jump discontinuity in s2,
then the allocation A[s] of the t-player can be an arbitrary crossing, quasi-flipping, or
quasi-bundling allocation, such that all critical values for task 1 are at least φ(s−1 ) and at
most φ(s+1 ), and similarly for task 2.
Symmetric statements hold for the s-player with the critical-value-functions φ−1(t1) and
η−1(t2). In summary, every relaxed task-independent allocation is identical with a task-independent
allocation on ti ∈ [0,∞) \ Ti, si ∈ [0, B) \ Si, where the T1, T2, S1, S2 are countable sets.
A.1.2 1-dimensional mechanisms
In a one-dimensional mechanism at most two possible allocations are ever realized. The critical-
value function between the two possible allocations is an arbitrary increasing function of the
respective input variables.
Because of the assumption that R∅(s) 6= ∅ for every s, one of the occuring allocations of the
t-player must be the allocation ∅. If the two occuring allocations (for the t-player) are ∅ and
12, we call the mechanism bundling mechanism. In the other cases when 1, and ∅; or when 2,
and ∅ are the possible allocations of the t-player, the mechanism is identical with a degenerate
task-independent mechanism, where φ ≡ 0 or η ≡ 0. Therefore we define only the case of a
bundling mechanism in detail. We note that any bundling mechanism can be considered as a
relaxed affine minimizer, with γ1 =∞ and γ2 =∞, but it will be convenient to treat bundling
mechanisms separately.
Definition 13. In a bundling mechanism only the allocations ∅ and 12 can occur. There is an
arbitrary, increasing function ξ : [0, B)→ [0,∞) so that ξ(s1 + s2) is the lowest value such that
if t1 + t2 > ξ(s1 + s2) then the t-player gets ∅.
If ξ has a jump discontinuity in some point s1+s2 then the critical value may depend on the
concrete (s1, s2) with the given fixed sum, as long as it is between ξ((s1+s2)
−) and ξ((s1+s2)+).
A.1.3 Relaxed affine minimizers
Definition 14. An allocation A is an affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants per
player µt and µs, and constants γ∅, γ12, γ1, γ2 ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞} per allocation (say, of the t-
player), so that for every input (t, s) the allocation A(t, s) minimizes over
µt(t1 + t2) + γ12, µt · t1 + µs · s2 + γ1, µs · s1 + µt · t2 + γ2, µs(s1 + s2) + γ∅.
In some affine minimizers, if s1 + s2 and t1 + t2 are both ’small’, then the mechanism locally
’looks like’ a bundling mechanism, with only the regions R∅ and R12 for both players. If this is
the case for all (s1, s2) and all (t1, t2) with sums s1 + s2 < D and t1 + t2 < C for some given
C,D > 0, then the mechanism becomes locally a bundling mechanism. This is formulated more
precisely in the next definition:
Definition 15. An allocationA is a relaxed affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants per
player µt and µs, and constants γα per allocation α (of the t-player), furthermore an arbitrary
increasing function ξ : [0,min(γ1, γ2) − γ∅) → [0,∞) (if the interval [0,min(γ1, γ2) − γ∅) is
nonempty) with min(γ1, γ2)− γ12 = ξ(min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅), so that for every input (t, s)
a) if µs · (s1 + s2) ≥ min(γ1, γ2)−γ∅, the allocation A(t, s) is that of an affine minimizer with
the given constants
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b) if µs · (s1+s2) ≤ min(γ1, γ2)−γ∅, then if µt · (t1+ t2) > ξ(µs · (s1+s2)) then the allocation
for the t-player is ∅ and if µt · (t1 + t2) ≤ ξ(µs · (s1 + s2)) then it is 12.
The condition min(γ1, γ2)−γ12 = ξ(min(γ1, γ2)−γ∅) is required so that the affine minimizer
(a) is appropriately ‘glued’ to the bundling mechanism (b).
A.1.4 Constant mechanisms
In a constant mechanism the allocation is independent of the bids of at least one of the players.
This property can also be interpreted as being an affine minimizer with multiplicative constant
µ = 0. Since we are interested in non-constant critical value functions, it will be convenient to
treat constant mechanisms separately from affine minimizers.
A.2 The main result
Theorem 4. Every WMON allocation for two tasks and two additive players with bids t ∈
(0,∞)× (0,∞) and s ∈ (0, B)× (0, B), where both tasks are always allocated, and R∅(s) 6= ∅ for
every s, is one of these four types: (1) relaxed affine minimizer, (2) relaxed task-independent
mechanism (3) one-dimensional mechanism, or (4) constant mechanism.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Notation. For the critical values (boundary positions) of the t-player for given s ∈ [0, B)× [0, B)
we use the notation f ′(s) = P1(s), g′(s) = P2(s) (s is omitted from the notation if it is clear
from the context).
The critical values f ′, g′ ∈ [0,∞) are always defined and finite, since f ′ = ∞ or g′ = ∞
would mean R∅ = ∅.
We prove next, that f ′ is an increasing function of s1, furthermore it is continuous in almost
every (i.e., up to at most countably many) point s1 ∈ [0, B), and in every s1 where f ′ is
continuous, it is independent of s2. Symmetric statements hold for g
′.
Lemma 7. f ′ is monotone increasing in s1 in the following strong sense: Let s2, s′2 be arbitrary.
If s1 < s
′
1 then f
′(s1, s2) ≤ f ′(s′1, s′2).
Proof. Let s = (s1, s2), and s
′ = (s′1, s′2), and assume for contradiction that f ′(s) > f ′(s′). Then
there exists a tˆ (with high enough tˆ2) so that tˆ ∈ R1(s) but tˆ ∈ R∅(s′). In turn, in the allocation
A[tˆ] the s-player gets both tasks if he bids s′, and he gets only task 2 with bid s, contradicting
WMON for the s-player, because s1 < s
′
1 (cf. Figure 6).
Since f ′(., s2) is increasing as a function of s1, it must be continuous in all but at most
countably many points s1. Furthermore, since f
′ is increasing independently of s2, it must be
independent of s2 in all s1 where it is continuous, as we show next.
Lemma 8. If f ′ is continuous as a function of s1 in some point (s¯1, s¯2), then it is independent
of s2, i.e., then f
′(s¯1, s2) = f ′(s¯1, s¯2) for every s2.
Proof. Let f ′(., s¯2) be continuous as a function of s1 in the point s¯1. Assume for contradiction
w.l.o.g., that f ′(s¯1, s¯2) > f ′(s¯1, s2) for some s2 6= s¯2. Since f ′(., s¯2) is continuous in the point
s¯1, we can take a s¯1 − δ, so that f ′(s¯1 − δ, s¯2) > f ′(s¯1, s2) also holds. However, this contradicts
Lemma 7, because s¯1 − δ < s¯1.
We introduce similar notation for other critical values of the t-player based on the virtual
payments.
Notation. If R12(s) 6= ∅ and R2 6= ∅, OR P12−P2 = 0, then let f(s) = P12−P2. Symmetrically,
if R12(s) 6= ∅ and R1 6= ∅, OR P12 − P1 = 0, then let g(s) = P12 − P1.
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As opposed to f ′ and g′, the values f and g are not defined for every s ∈ [0, B) × [0, B);
this is needed for the following lemmas to hold. Note however that the only case when neither
f, nor g are defined is, when f ′ = g′ = 0, and the allocation is quasi-bundling. The proofs of
Lemmas 9 and 10 are somewhat more involved variants of those of Lemmas 7 and 8, and are
deferred to the full version.
Lemma 9. f is monotone increasing in s1 in the following sense: Let s1 ≤ s′1 and s2 < s′2. If f is
defined for s = (s1, s2), then f is also defined for s
′ = (s′1, s′2). Furthermore f(s1, s2) ≤ f(s′1, s′′2),
whenever s1 < s
′
1, and f is defined in (s
′
1, s
′′
2). Symmetric statements hold for g.
Lemma 10. If f is continuous as a function of s1 in some point (s¯1, s¯2), then it is independent
of s2, i.e., then f
′(s¯1, s2) = f ′(s¯1, s¯2) for every s2 where f is defined, in particular for every
s2 > s¯2.
We will sometimes abuse notation and consider f and f ′ as univariate functions of s1. This
is incorrect only for at most countably many s1 where these functions have jump discontinuities.
In these s1 the above single-variate functions remain undefined, or can be identified with, e.g.,
limx→s−1 f(x). Analogously we will often treat g
′ and g as univariate functions.
Intuition. CASE A. below treats all the cases when for some s an allocation function of the
t-player exists, where at least three (interiors of) regions R are nonempty, the allocation is
quasi-flipping or quasi-bundling, and one of the critical value functions f ′, g′, f, g is continuous
in s as univariate function. In this case the WMON allocation function over the whole additive
domain with bounded s, is a relaxed affine minimizer. The proof of this is based on three
observations, roughly summarized as follows:
First, that once an allocation of the t-player is quasi-bundling (quasi-flipping) in some s,
where at least one of f, g, f ′, g′ is continuous as univariate function, we can infinitesimally adjust
s in a carefully selected direction, so that the allocation remains quasi-bundling (quasi-flipping),
and all of these functions are continuous (when defined) in the adjusted s.
Second, that if in any quasi-flipping or quasi-bundling allocation all the critical value func-
tions f ′, g′, f, g are continuous in some point s, then they all must have the same derivative in
this point. This will follow from the WMON property of the s-player.
Third, that in such points f ′ and f (if defined) are independent of s2, and g′, and g are
independent of s1, which eventually implies that the above derivatives must remain the same
for every s, implying that each of these critical value functions is linear.
In CASE B. a quasi-flipping allocation exists, but f ′ ≡ g′ ≡ 0 (for every s), and therefore the
regions R1(s) = R2(s) = ∅ for every s. In this case the allocation is a 1-dimensional monotone
allocation over the sets of positive s and t, where the two tasks are bundled and always allocated
to the same player.
Finally, in CASE C. we consider those allocations where the t-player has a crossing figure
whenever any of f ′, g′ (or f, g) is continuous in s. In this case the mechanism is a relaxed
task-independent mechanism.
We remark that if in CASE A. the common derivatives of f, g, f ′, g′ happen to be 0, or in
CASES B. or C. the arbitrary increasing critical value functions turn out to be constant, then
we obtain a constant mechanism. We do not discuss these cases separately in the rest of the
proof.
We start the argument with three lemmas, stating that the mechanism must be a (relaxed)
affine minimizer, if a single point sˆ exists where all of f ′, g′ and f, g (if defined) are continuous
as univariate functions (i.e., f ′ and f in the point sˆ1 and g′ and g in the point sˆ2), and the
allocation A[sˆ] is quasi-flipping or quasi-bundling.
Lemma 11. Assume that both f and g are undefined or zero in every s ∈ (0, B)× (0, B). If an
sˆ ∈ (0, B) × (0, B) exists so that the allocation A[sˆ] of the t-player is quasi-flipping, f ′ > 0 is
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Figure 7: Illustrations to the proofs of Claims 1, 2, and 3
continuous in the point sˆ1, and g
′ > 0 is continuous in the point sˆ2, then the mechanism is an
affine minimizer (with γ12 =∞) for nonzero t and s.
Proof. The proof makes use of the following claim, which is the core observation implying the
linearity of the payment functions whenever an allocation is non-crossing:
Claim 1. Assume that f ′ > 0 is continuous as univariate function in the points s1 and s1 + δ,
and g′ > 0 is continuous in the points s2, and s2+δ, furthermore the allocation of the t-player is
quasi-flipping in a 2δ-neighborhood of s = (s1, s2). Then f
′(s1+δ)−f ′(s1) = g′(s2+δ)−g′(s2).
Proof. (Figure 7 (a)) Assume for contradiction w.l.o.g. that f ′(s1 + δ) − f ′(s1) > g′(s2 + δ) −
g′(s2). Since f ′ is continuous in s1 + δ, it even holds that f ′(s1 + δ′)−f ′(s1) > g′(s2 + δ)−g′(s2)
for some δ′ < δ.
Let s′ = (s1 + δ′, s2 + δ). Now there exists a point tˆ so that tˆ ∈ R2(s) but tˆ ∈ R1(s′). In
turn, for this bid tˆ of the t-player the s-player receives task 1 if he bids s, and he receives task
2 if he bids s′. This contradicts WMON for the s-player because s′1− s1 = δ′ < δ = s′2− s2.
By assumption of the lemma, f or g are never (defined and) positive for any s ∈ (0, B) ×
(0, B). Therefore, the allocation is quasi-flipping for every s ∈ (0, B)×(0, B) for which f ′(s) > 0
and g′(s) > 0.
Let us now fix s¯1, and δ = 1. Since g
′ has a jump in at most countably many points, we can
pick a s¯2 so that g
′ is continuous in s¯2 + q whenever q ∈ Q and (s¯2 + q) ∈ (0, B). Restrict now
g′ on all such s2 = s¯2 + q points. For the constant ∆ = f ′(s¯1 + 1)− f ′(s¯1) Claim 1 implies for
the restricted g′ that
g′(s2 + 1) = g′(s2) + ∆
for every s2 in the restricted set. Further, by taking δ = 1/2, we also obtain g
′(s2 + 1/2) =
g′(s2) + ∆/2, and analogously
g′(s2 + 1/2r) = g′(s2) + ∆/2r
over all s2 in the restriction. By taking the limit r →∞, we obtain that the restriction of g′ is
linear. Then, using that g′ is increasing, and the set of s¯2 + q points is dense in (0, B) we obtain
that g′ must be truncated linear over all s2 > 0. As a further consequence g′ is continuous, and
independent of s1. (The short proof presented here does not exclude that g
′ jumps to 0 in a
certain s2. An argument as in the proof of Claim 1 can exclude this.)
By analogous argument we obtain that f ′ is independent of s2 and linear over all s1 > 0 for
which f ′(s1) > 0. Moreover, by Claim 1 f ′ has the same multiplicative constant µ as g′.
In summary, for s > 0, for the virtual payments of the t-player we obtain P1(s) = f
′(s) =
max(µ · s1 + γ1, 0), and P2(s) = g′(s) = max(µ · s2 + γ2, 0), and P12(s) = max(P1(s), P2(s))
follows from f = 0 or g = 0.
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(We still need to exclude that the allocation is fully bundling for some s; however this
is easy to prove, because the region R12 could only increase with increasing s and could not
disappear in s¯ and in every higher s.) The described virtual payments define an affine minimizer
over t ∈ (0,∞) × (0,∞) and s ∈ (0, B) × (0, B). If µ = 0, then the mechanism is a constant
mechanism (the allocation is independent of s). If ti = 0 or si = 0, then the allocation can be
different from that of an affine minimizer.
Lemma 12. Assume that g′(s2) = 0 for every s2 ∈ [0, B). If an sˆ ∈ (0, B) × (0, B) exists so
that the allocation A[sˆ] of the t-player is quasi-bundling, f ′ > 0 is continuous in the point sˆ1,
and g > 0 is continuous in the point sˆ2, then the mechanism is a relaxed affine minimizer (with
γ2 =∞).
For the symmetric case, assume that f ′(s1) = 0 for every s1 ∈ [0, B). If an sˆ ∈ (0, B)×(0, B)
exists so that the allocation A[sˆ] of the t-player is quasi-bundling, g′ > 0 is continuous in the
point sˆ2, and f > 0 is continuous in the point sˆ1, then the mechanism is a relaxed affine
minimizer (with γ1 =∞).
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that the conditions of the first statement of the lemma hold. We use an
analogous claim as in the previous lemma:
Claim 2. Assume that f ′ > 0 is continuous as univariate function in the points s1 and s1 + δ,
and g > 0 is continuous in the points s2, and s2− δ, furthermore the allocation of the t-player is
quasi-bundling in a 2δ-neighborhood of s = (s1, s2). then f
′(s1 + δ)− f ′(s1) = g(s2)− g(s2− δ).
Proof. (Figure 7 (b)) Assume for contradiction first that f ′(s1 + δ)− f ′(s1) > g(s2)− g(s2− δ).
Since f ′ is continuous in s1 + δ, it even holds that f ′(s1 + δ′) − f ′(s1) > g(s2) − g(s2 − δ) for
some δ′ < δ.
Let s′ = (s1+δ′, s2−δ). Now there exists a point tˆ so that tˆ ∈ R∅(s) but tˆ ∈ R12(s′). In turn,
for this bid tˆ of the t-player the s-player receives both tasks 1, 2 if he bids s, and he receives no
task if he bids s′. This contradicts WMON for the s-player because s1 + s2 > s1 + s2 + δ′− δ =
s′1 + s′2.
Assume now that f ′(s1 + δ)− f ′(s1) < g(s2)− g(s2 − δ). Since f ′ is continuous in s1 + δ, it
even holds that f ′(s1 + δ′)− f ′(s1) < g(s2)− g(s2 − δ) for some δ′ > δ.
Let s′ = (s1+δ′, s2−δ). Now there exists a point tˆ so that tˆ ∈ R12(s) but tˆ ∈ R∅(s′). In turn,
for this bid tˆ of the t-player the s-player receives no task if he bids s, and he receives both tasks if
he bids s′. This contradicts WMON for the s-player because s1+s2 < s1+s2+δ′−δ = s′1+s′2.
Since g′ ≡ 0, the allocation is quasi-bundling whenever f ′(s) > 0 and g(s) > 0. By fixing s¯1
we fix an f ′ > 0, because f ′ is continuous in s¯1 and therefore independent of s2.
Like in the proof of Lemma 11, we can show that g(s2) = P12(s2) − P1 is a (truncated)
linear function over s2 ∈ (0, B). In turn, by fixing s¯2, and thus fixing a g > 0, we obtain that
f ′ = P1(s1) is truncated linear over s1 ∈ (0, B) with the same derivative as g.
Assume finally, that f ′(s1) = 0 iff s1 ≤ D, for some D > 0, and g(s2) = µs2 + C for
an C > 0. Then for (s1 + s2) ∈ [0, D) the P12(s1 + s2) is an arbitrary increasing function
P12 : [0, D) → [0, C), because there exists no s > 0 such that s1 + s2 < D but f ′(s1) > 0
would hold, and g would be defined (and similarly for t1 + t2 < C) so P12 needs not be linear
over this interval. These s and t values having sum of coordinates below the given constants D
and C, respectively, are the only exceptions where the mechanism is a 1-dimensional bundling
mechanism and not an affine minimizer.
Lemma 13. Assume that an sˆ ∈ (0, B)× (0, B) exists so that f ′ > 0 and f > 0 are defined and
both are continuous in the point sˆ1; and g
′ > 0 and g > 0 are defined and both are continuous
in the point sˆ2. If the allocation A[sˆ] of the t-player is quasi-flipping then the mechanism is an
affine minimizer; if A[sˆ] is quasi-bundling, then the mechanism is a relaxed affine minimizer.
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Proof. Assume first that the allocation A[s¯] is quasi-flipping, i.e., 0 < f(s¯) < f ′(s¯) and 0 <
g(s¯) < g′(s¯). A claim analogous to Claim 1 says that f and g must have equal difference
quotients:
Claim 3. Assume that f > 0 is continuous as univariate function in the points s1 and s1 + δ,
and g > 0 is continuous in the points s2, and s2 + δ, furthermore the allocation of the t-player is
quasi-flipping in a 2δ-neighborhood of s = (s1, s2). Then f(s1 + δ)− f(s1) = g(s2 + δ)− g(s2).
Let us now fix s1 = s¯1. Since f and f
′ are independent of s2 for this fixed s¯1, Claims 1 and
3 can be applied, (as in the proof of Lemma 11), to prove that g and g′ are truncated linear
functions with the same multiplicative constant µ that is at the same time the derivative of f
and f ′ in the point s¯1. (For the applicability of the claims notice that A[s] remains quasi-flipping
in some neighborhood of s¯, since f < f ′ are continuous in s¯1, and in continuous points even
independent of s2, so f < f
′ must hold in a neighborhood.) Now, fixing s¯2 and switching the
roles of f and g we obtain that f and f ′ are also truncated linear functions with multiplicative
constant µ.
The allocation remains quasi-flipping (because f < f ′) as long as f ′ > 0 and g′ > 0. At least
one of f or g is defined for every s ∈ [0, B) × [0, B). Therefore, at least three of f, g, f ′, g′ are
always uniquely defined (by the respective truncated linear functions), and they determine the
allocation of the t-player (up to tie-breaking), which determines the allocation of the s-player.
The mechanism must be an affine minimizer.
Second, assume that A[s¯] is quasi-bundling. We can use Claim 2 to prove that f, g, f ′ and
g′ are truncated linear with the same multiplicative constant µ on their whole domain, and A[s]
remains quasi-bundling as long as f ′ > 0 or g′ > 0 holds. This determines the allocation as an
affine minimizer if f ′ > 0 or g′ > 0, because then at least three of f, g, f ′ or g′ are defined. This
is not the case if f ′ = g′ = 0, i.e. when the allocation is fully bundling. P12(x) is determined
only if an s = (s1, s2) with x = s1 + s2 exists so that f
′(s1) > 0 or g′(s2) > 0. If (for x < D
for a given constant D > 0) no such s exists, then P12(x) is some arbitrary increasing function
P12 : [0, D) → [0, C) and the mechanism becomes 1-dimensional. C is here a constant playing
the same role for the t as D for s. All in all, the mechanism is a relaxed affine minimizer.
CASE A. ∃s¯ = (s¯1, s¯2) ∈ (0, B) × (0, B) so that f ′(s¯) > 0, f ′ as a function of s1 is
continuous in the point s¯1, and the allocation of the t-player is quasi-flipping or
quasi-bundling, (OR the analogous case holds for g′);
Lemma 14. In CASE A. the conditions of at least one of Lemmas 11, 12 or 13 hold, and so
the mechanism is a (relaxed) affine minimizer over positive valuations s and t.
Proof.
Case 1. in s¯ the allocation of the t-player is quasi-flipping
Since the allocation is quasi-flipping, it follows that f ′ > 0 and g′ > 0. Moreover at least
one of f or g is defined in s¯, in which case f < f ′ and g < g′, respectively.
Case 1.1 f is defined for s¯ in the allocation of the t-player
We show first that we can assume w.l.o.g. that all of f ′, f and g′ are continuous as univariate
functions in the points s¯1, and s¯2, respectively, otherwise we could slightly decrease s¯1, and after
that, slightly increase s¯2, so that the continuity of all these critical value functions holds, and
the allocation is still quasi-flipping:
If f ′ and f are both continuous in s¯1, then set sˆ1 = s¯1. If f ′ and f are not both continuous
in s¯1, then we can reduce s¯1 to sˆ1 = s¯1 − δ for an arbitrarily small value δ so that f ′ remains
nearly the same and continuous, and f is continuous (if still defined) in sˆ1. Since f
′ does not
change much, and f cannot increase, the allocation is still quasi-flipping in (sˆ1, s¯2).
We need to show that f is still defined in (sˆ1, s¯2). For this purpose, consider a point tˆ =
(f ′(s¯) − , g′(s¯) − 2). Since the allocation is quasi-flipping in s¯, it holds that tˆ ∈ R2(s¯), but
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if f ′(sˆ1) > s¯1 − , then it would get into R1 or into R12, unless the allocation is still quasi-
flipping with a well-defined f. Therefore, for this tˆ, s¯ ∈ Rs1, but (sˆ1, s¯2) ∈ Rs2 ∪ Rs∅ would hold,
contradicting WMON.
Now, given that f ′ and f are continuous in s¯1, we can set sˆ2 ≥ s¯2, so that g′ is continuous,
and if f > 0 then g is (defined and) continuous in sˆ2; f and f
′ do not change, since in s¯1 both
are independent of s2. Therefore, the allocation in sˆ is quasi-flipping.
Case 1.1.1 f(sˆ) > 0
By Lemma 13, in this case the mechanism is an affine minimizer.
Case 1.1.2 f(sˆ) = 0
Case 1.1.2.1 both f and g are either zero or undefined for every (s1, s2)
By Lemma 11, in this case the mechanism is an affine minimizer.
Case 1.1.2.2 ∃s so that f(s) > 0 or g(s) > 0
We show that even a point s′ exists where the allocation is quasi-flipping, and each of
f, f ′, g, g′ are positive and continuous in s′ in as univariate functions. Then the allocation is an
affine minimizer by Lemma 13.
Recall that f ′, and f = 0 are continuous in the point sˆ1, and g′ is continuous in the point
sˆ2, moreover the allocation A[sˆ] is quasi-flipping. Since by assumption an s = (s1, s2) exists
so that f(s) > 0 or g(s) > 0, this must be the case for every s′ with s′1 ≥ s1 and s′2 ≥ s2, by
Lemma 9. Therefore we can assume w.l.o.g. that s′1 > sˆ1 and s′2 > sˆ2. But then, by the same
lemma f is defined in s′ (since f is defined in sˆ), and it cannot be that f(s′) = 0, because then
g would be undefined (or zero) in s′ as well. So f(s′) > 0 holds. Since f(s′), f ′(s′) and g′(s′)
are all positive, g(s′) must be defined and g(s′) > 0 must hold, too. Finally, we assume w.l.o.g.
that f ′ and f are continuous in s′1 and g′ and g are continuous in the point s′2, because the
(univariate) continuity holds in almost every s′1 and s′2.
We need to show that the allocation is quasi-flipping in s′. We first consider the allocation
in the point (sˆ1, s
′
2). Since for sˆ1 the f and f
′ are independent of s2, they do not change as sˆ2
gets changed to s′2, and the allocation remains quasi flipping. Now let us increase sˆ1 to s′1. We
prove that A[s′] is still quasi-flipping, so that Lemma 13 can be applied with s′ playing the role
of sˆ.
Assume for contradiction that A[s′] is crossing or quasi-bundling. Since in s′ each of f, f ′, g, g′
are defined and continuous, we can decrease s′2 to s′2 − δ, by an arbitrarily small δ, the f and
f ′ do not change, and the allocation is still crossing or quasi-bundling. Now there is a point
tˆ = (0, g′(s′2)− ) so that tˆ ∈ R1(sˆ1, s′2) but tˆ ∈ R12(s′1, s′2− δ). This contradicts WMON for the
s-player for this tˆ, because for (sˆ1, s
′
2) he gets task 2, but with bid (s
′
1, s
′
2 − δ) he gets no task.
Case 1.2 g is defined for s¯ in the allocation of the t-player
There exists a s∗2 > s¯2 so that in this point g′ and g are both continuous as univariate
functions. Note that f ′(s¯1, s∗2) = f ′(s¯) by Lemma 8. We claim that in the point (s¯1, s∗2)
the allocation of the t-player is quasi-flipping, so that we can use the same argument as in
CASE 1.1.1, with g and g′ playing the roles of f and f ′, respectively. This will prove that the
mechanism is an affine minimizer.
Assume for contradiction that for (s¯1, s
∗
2) the allocation is crossing or quasi bundling. Notice
that in this case g(s∗2) ≥ g′(s∗2) ≥ g′(s¯2) > 0. The first inequality holds since the allocation
became crossing or quasi-flipping; the second holds by the monotonicity of g′.
Finally, we reduce s¯1 to s
∗
1 = s¯1 − δ, so that f ′(s∗1) ≈ f ′(s¯1). Let s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2). Since g and
g′ are independent of s1, and f ′(s∗1) ≈ f ′(s¯1), the allocation of the t-player is nearly the same
for s∗ as for (s¯1, s∗2), and in particular g(s∗) ≥ g′(s¯) still holds.
Now, using g(s∗) ≥ g′(s¯), and f ′(s∗) ≈ f ′(s¯), it can be shown that now there exists a t point
so that t ∈ R2(s¯) but t ∈ R12(s∗). Consequently, for this t point, s¯ ∈ Rs1(t) and s∗ ∈ Rs∅(t),
contradicting monotonicity, since s∗1 = s¯1 − δ.
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Case 2. in s¯ the allocation A[s¯] of the t-player is quasi-bundling
Since f ′ > 0, and the allocation is quasi-bundling, g(s¯) is defined and positive.
Case 2.1 g′(s¯) > 0
Since g′ > 0, and the allocation is quasi-bundling, f(s¯) is also defined, and f ′ < f. If f is
continuous in the point s¯1 then set sˆ1 = s¯1. Otherwise set sˆ1 = s¯1 + δ for some small δ > 0,
so that both f and f ′ are continuous in the point sˆ1, and therefore independent of s2. If δ is
small enough then the allocation remains quasi-bundling, because f is increasing in s1 and f
′
is continuous in the point s¯1. Finally, if g
′ or g are both continuous in the point s¯2, then set
sˆ2 = s¯2. Otherwise set sˆ2 = s¯2 + δ so that g
′ and g are continuous (and positive) in the point
sˆ2. Since f
′ < f still holds, the allocation is quasi-bundling, and by Lemma 13 it is a relaxed
affine minimizer.
Case 2.2 g′(s¯) = 0
Case 2.2.1. ∃s2 so that g′(s2) > 0
Our goal is to increase s¯1 and s¯2 so that g
′ becomes positive, and CASE 1.2.1 applies.
We pick an tˆ = (f ′(s¯1)+, 0) ∈ R12(s¯). This is possible, since A[s¯] is quasi-bundling. It holds
then the s-player gets no task with bids s¯ and tˆ. We increase s¯1 to s
∗
1 so that f
′(s∗1) < f ′(s¯1)+ ,
and f ′ is continuous as univariate function in s∗1. This is possible since f ′ is continuous in s¯1. We
also increase s¯2 to s
∗
2, so that g
′ is strictly positive in the point s∗2. We claim, that in s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2)
the allocation A[s∗] of the t-player is quasi-bundling, and therefore with s∗ in the role of s¯, the
proof can be completed as in CASE 1.2.1.
For tˆ the s-player gets no task with bid s¯ (see above), thus by WMON he also gets no task
with bid s∗, since s¯ < s∗. In turn, the t-player gets both tasks with bids s∗ and tˆ. Given that
f ′(s∗1) < f ′(s¯1) +  = tˆ1, this proves that the allocation A[s∗] of the t-player is quasi-bundling.
Case 2.2.2. g′(s2) = 0 for all s2 ∈ [0, B)
If g is continuous in the point s¯2, then we can apply Lemma 12 with sˆ = s¯.
If g has a jump in s¯2, then let sˆ1 = s¯1, and sˆ2 = s¯2 + δ so that g is continuous in the point
sˆ2. Then g is defined in sˆ, and g(sˆ2) > g(s¯2) > 0 by Lemma 9. Since g
′(sˆ2) = 0 by the case
assumption, g(sˆ) > g′(sˆ), so the allocation is quasi-bundling, and again we can apply Lemma 12
with sˆ = s¯.
CASE B. CASE A. does not hold, but ∃s¯ = (s¯1, s¯2) ∈ (0, B)× (0, B) so that f ′(s¯) = 0,
f ′ as a function of s1 is continuous in the point s¯1, and the allocation of the t-player
is quasi-bundling, (OR the analogous case holds for g′);
Claim 4. In CASE B f ′(s) ≡ 0 and g′(s) ≡ 0 for every s ∈ [0, B)× [0, B).
Proof. In s¯ the f ′ is independent of s2, whereas g′ is increasing in s2. Assume first for contra-
diction that g′ > 0 for some s2, and take an s∗2 > s¯2 point where g′ is continuous, and strictly
positive.
Since CASE A does not hold (for g′), in (s¯1, s∗2) the allocation of the t-player must be
crossing, while f ′ = 0 still holds.
For s¯ the allocation was bundling, so there is a point t = (, ) that is in R12(s¯) (because of
the bundling alloc.) and in R2(s¯1+δ, s
∗
2) (because of the crossing alloc with g
′ > 0, and because
f ′ is continuous and zero in s¯1, it can be continuous and arbitrarily small or zero in some s¯1+δ).
For this t in the allocation of the s-player s¯ ∈ Rs∅ but (s¯1 + δ, s∗2) ∈ Rs1, contradicting WMON.
We obtained that g′ ≡ 0. By symmetric argument, using the existence of a bundling allocation
in s¯, and continuous g′ there, we obtain f ′ ≡ 0.
Corollary 3. Over t ∈ (0,∞)× (0,∞) and s ∈ [0, B)× [0, B) the mechanism is 1-dimensional
mechanism bundling the two tasks; for t1 = 0 and/or t2 = 0 the allocation of the s-player can
be non-bundling.
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CASE C. for every s ∈ (0, B) × (0, B) point where either f ′ or g′ is continuous (as
univariate functions), the allocation of the t-player is crossing
It is easy to show that in every point s where f or g as univariate function is continuous in
the point s1, resp s2, the allocation must be crossing (otherwise we cound change s by a small
value so that both f and f ′ (or g and g′) would be continuous and the allocation would be still
non-crossing). Thus, the allocation can be quasi-flipping or quasi-bundling, only in points where
each of f, g (when defined), and f ′ and g′ have a jump discontinuity as univariate functions.
In this case the allocation function corresponds to a relaxed task-independent mechanism, or
1-dimensional mechanism such that the t-player never gets task 1 or he never gets task 2.
B Mechanisms for 2 tasks and 2 machines with submodular
valuations
In this section we relax the assumption of additivity of the valuation of the t-player in different
ways, and show in Theorem 5 that for all these extensions of the additive domain the only
remaining truthful mechanisms are relaxed affine minimizers (or constant mechanisms), and 1-
dimensional mechanisms. This result holds for (i) arbitrary (normalized, monotone) valuations,
(ii) submodular or subadditive valuations9, (iii) -additive valuations (see V below), and (iv)
for valuations that are submodular and -additive. In essence, we characterize mechanisms
for two tasks and two players in case (i), where the t-player has arbitrary monotone valuation
(t1, t2, t12), and the s-player has additive valuation (s1, s2, s1 +s2) with s1 and s2 both bounded
by an arbitrarily large fixed value B. We use the characterization for two additive players
from Section A, and show that relaxed task-independent mechanisms are not extendable onto
the nonadditive domain, unless they are task-independent affine minimizers. Along the proof
we argue that our lemmas carry over straightforward to cases (ii), (iii) and (iv) as well. In
particular, task-independent mechanisms cannot be extended even to an arbitrarily ’narrow’
superset V of the (2-dimensional) additive domain in 3-dimensions.
B.1 Basic concepts and notation
For simplicity of presentation we consider any bid of either of the players as a vector of three
entries. We summarize the notation for the considered domains of valuations (cost functions)
as follows:
Definition 16. V ⊂ R3≥0 is the 3D set of all monotone valuations:
V = {(x1, x2, x12) ∈ R3≥0 |x12 ≥ x1 ≥ 0, x12 ≥ x2 ≥ 0};
V+ ⊂ V is the additive plane:
V+ = {(x1, x2, x12) ∈ R3≥0 |x1, x2 ≥ 0, x12 = x1 + x2};
V+,B ⊂ V+ is the additive plane, restricted to [0, B)× [0, B) for some arbitrarily large fixed B
V+,B = {(x1, x2, x12) ∈ R3≥0 | 0 ≤ x1, x2 < B, x12 = x1 + x2};
V ⊂ V is the -neighborhood10 of the additive plane for some arbitrary fixed  > 0 :
V = {(x1, x2, x12) ∈ V | x12 ∈ (x1 + x2 − , x1 + x2 + )};
9for two tasks subadditive and submodular valuations are the same
10We are quite free to use any reasonable definition of such a neighborhood, e.g., we could have chosen x12 ∈
((1− )(x1 +x2), (1+ )(x1 +x2)), or even the intersection of the latter with the current (additive) neighborhood.
The characterization is not very sensitive to this definition.
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Vsubmod ⊂ V is the 3D set of all submodular valuations; for two tasks this is equivalent with
subadditivity:
Vsubmod = {(x1, x2, x12) ∈ V | x12 ≤ x1 + x2}.
Let V ∗ ∈ {V, V, Vsubmod , Vsubmod ∩ V}, and let (A, Pˆ ) denote the allocation and payment
functions of a truthful mechanism on V ∗ × V+,B. For the valuations t = (t1, t2, t12) and s =
(s1, s2, s12) taken from some given domains t ∈ V ∗ and s ∈ V+,B, the allocation is A(t, s) =
(αt, αs), where αt, αs ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}. Since both tasks are always allocated, αt determines αs =
α¯t, and for simplicity we often identify A(t, s) with the allocation αt to the t-player.
For given s ∈ V+,B, and α ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}, the interior (w.r.t. V ∗) of the set of all t ∈ V ∗
where the t-player is allocated α is denoted by Rα(s) ⊂ V ∗. We omit (s) from the notation
if s is clear from the context. Rα(s) is an open set in V
∗. Similarly, for given t ∈ V ∗, the
interior (w.r.t. V+,B) of the set of all s ∈ V+,B where the s-player is allocated α is denoted by
Rsα(t) ⊂ V+,B.
We will assume regarding allocations of the t-player that R∅(s) is nonempty for every s. This
assumption is without loss of generality for allocations A with finite approximation ratio of the
makespan. Since R∅ 6= ∅, we can assume w.l.o.g. that the payment function Pˆ is normalized,
that is, Pˆ∅(s) = 0 for every s.
The payments to the t-player for taking the tasks 12, 1, and 2 respectively, depending on the
bid s are denoted by Pˆ12(s), Pˆ1(s), Pˆ2(s). We omit the argument s if it is clear from the context.
The payments to the s-player depending on the bid t are denoted by Pˆ s12(t), Pˆ
s
1 (t), Pˆ
s
2 (t).
Observe that a truthful mechanism (A, Pˆ ) over V ∗ × V+,B is a truthful mechanism when
restricted to V+ × V+,B. We denote this restricted mechanism by (A|V+×V+,B , Pˆ |V+×V+,B ).
We introduce the types of WMON allocations that can occur on V ∗ × V+,B.
B.1.1 Relaxed affine minimizers
Definition 17. An allocation A is an affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants per
player µt and µs, and constants γα ∈ R ∪ {−∞,∞} per allocation (say, here α = αt), so that
for every input (t, s) the allocation A(t, s) minimizes over
µt · t12 + γ12, µt · t1 + µs · s2 + γ1, µs · s1 + µt · t2 + γ2, µs(s1 + s2) + γ∅.
Definition 18. An allocationA is a relaxed affine minimizer, if there exist positive constants per
player µt and µs, and constants γα per allocation α (of the t-player), furthermore an arbitrary
increasing function ξ : [0,min(γ1, γ2) − γ∅) → [0,∞) (if the interval [0,min(γ1, γ2) − γ∅) is
nonempty) with min(γ1, γ2)− γ12 = ξ(min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅), so that for every input (t, s)
a) if µs · (s1 + s2) ≥ min(γ1, γ2)−γ∅, the allocation A(t, s) is that of an affine minimizer with
the given constants
b) if µs · (s1 + s2) ≤ min(γ1, γ2)− γ∅, then if µt · t12 > ξ(µs(s1 + s2)) then the allocation for
the t-player is ∅ and if µt · t12 < ξ(µs · (s1 + s2)) then it is 12.
B.1.2 Constant mechanisms
In a constant mechanism the allocation is independent of the bids of at least one of the players.
This property can also be interpreted as being an affine minimizer with multiplicative constant
µ = 0 for this player.
B.1.3 1-dimensional mechanisms
In a 1-dimensional mechanism only at most two possible allocations can occur. If the two
occuring allocations (for the t-player) are ∅ and 12, we call the mechanism bundling mechanism.
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Definition 19. In a bundling mechanism only the allocations ∅ and 12 can occur. There is an
arbitrary, increasing function ξ : [0, B) → [0,∞) so that if t12 > ξ(s1 + s2) then the t-player
gets ∅, and if t12 < ξ(s1 + s2) then the t-player gets 12.
If ξ has a jump discontinuity in some point s1 + s2 then the critical value for the t-player
to get the tasks may depend on the concrete (s1, s2) with the given fixed sum, as long as it is
between ξ((s1 + s2)
−) and ξ((s1 + s2)+).
In the other cases the only occuring allocations are ∅ and 1 or ∅ and 2, respectively. The
mechanism is in this case identical with a degenerate task-independent mechanism (see also
Section A) where task 2 (resp. task 1) is always received by the s-player. Such mechanisms
can also be extended to V × V+B. Notice however, that all 1-dimensional mechanisms have
arbitrarily high approximation ratio if we set the fixed bound B high enough.
B.2 The main result
Theorem 5. Every WMON allocation for two tasks and two players with bids t ∈ V and
s ∈ V+,B, where both tasks are always allocated, and R∅(s) 6= ∅ for every s, is one of these
three types: (1) relaxed affine minimizer, (2) one-dimensional mechanism, or (3) constant
mechanism. The same characterization holds for WMON allocations over V ∗ × V+,B, for V ∗ ∈
{V, Vsubmod , V, Vsubmod ∩ V}.
Remark. (a) We note that for t ∈ V or t ∈ Vsubmod , Theorem 5 has a shorter, direct proof
not using the characterization for additive players of Section A. However, to the best of our
knowledge this direct proof does not carry over to the almost-additive domain V for the t-player.
(b) Arguments analogous to the following proof show that the same characterization holds, e.g.,
for player valuations (t, s) in V × V, or Vsubmod × Vsubmod , or V × V+. Since this is not the
central topic of this paper, and similar characterizations have been known, we do not consider
these cases here: our primary goal is to show that even if the s-player remains additive and
even bounded, and the t-player is almost additive, the ’disturbing’ task-independent allocations
disappear.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5
B.3.1 Virtual payments
Let (A, Pˆ ) be a truthful mechanism for (t, s) over V ∗×V+,B, for V ∗ ∈ {V, Vsubmod , V, Vsubmod ∩
V}. We will use virtual payments for the t-player defined as follows.
Definition 20. For every truthful mechanism (A, Pˆ ) over (t, s) ∈ V ∗ × V+,B, or over (t, s) ∈
V+ × V+,B, we define the virtual payments iteratively. Let s be arbitrary fixed valuation from
V+,B. The payments of the t-player occuring in this definition are all defined for this given s.
P∅ = 0,
P1 = max{Pˆ1, 0}, P2 = max{Pˆ2, 0},
P12 = max{Pˆ12, P1, P2}.
Definition 21. We call a payment function P monotone, if for every s, and sets of tasks β ⊂ α,
it holds that Pβ(s) ≤ Pα(s).
Claim 5. The virtual payments are normalized, monotone and (A,P ) is a truthful mechanism.
Proof. The virtual payment fuction P is obviously normalized and monotone. We show that P
is truthful for the t-player for arbitrary s. We claim first that Pα(s) = Pˆα(s), whenever Rα(s)
is nonempty. We show this for α = 12, the cases α = 1 and α = 2 are similar. Assume for
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contradiction that t ∈ Rα(s), but P12 6= Pˆ12. In this case either P12 = Pˆ1, or P12 = Pˆ2, or
P12 = 0 = Pˆ∅, so the allocation α = 1, or α = 2, or α = ∅, respectively, is at least as profitable
as the more costly allocation α = 12, so t must be in the closure of some other region and
cannot be in the open interior R12, a contradiction.
In order to prove the truthfulness of P, we need to prove that the given allocation A(t)
maximizes the profit P − t for every t ∈ V ∗ (resp. for every t ∈ V+). For every fixed t it holds
that t ∈ Rα for some α with Rα 6= ∅. We show next that for this α, Pα − tα ≥ Pβ − tβ for all
β ∈ {12, 1, 2, ∅}.
If Rβ 6= ∅, then, by the first paragraph, Pα = Pˆα, and Pβ = Pˆβ, so the inequality holds,
because the Pˆ are truthful payments. Assume now, that Rβ = ∅. Then β ∈ {1, 2, 12}, by the
assumption R∅ 6= ∅. If β = 1, then R1 = ∅ and we claim that P1 = 0 must hold. Otherwise
Pˆ1 > 0, and the points t = (t1 < Pˆ1, t2 = L, t12 = t1 + L) (for large enough L) are in R1, (by
truthfulness of Pˆ ) contradicting R1 = ∅. Now, it holds that Pα− tα ≥ P∅ = 0 ≥ 0− t1 = P1− t1.
Here the first inequality follows from the statement (that Pα = Pˆα and P∅ = Pˆ∅) about nonempty
regions, and the truthfulness of Pˆ . For β = 2 the proof is analogous.
Assume finally that β = 12. We claim that then P12 = P1 or P12 = P2. Otherwise P12 =
Pˆ12 > max{Pˆ1, Pˆ2, 0}, and by truthfulness of Pˆ , for small enough  > 0 the t = (, , 2) must
be a point in R12, contradicting R12 = ∅. Assuming now w.l.o.g. P12 = P1, it holds that
Pα − tα ≥ P1 − t1 = P12 − t1 ≥ P12 − t12, where the first inequality was shown above, and the
last inequality holds by monotonicity of the valuations. This concludes the proof.
In fact, for given WMON allocation function A(t) as function of the bid t of the t-player (in
particular for the allocation function A[s] for arbitrary fixed s), the virtual payments are the
unique payments which are truthful, normalized and monotone, as we show next.
Claim 6. For every WMON allocation function A(t) of the t-player (i.e., for fixed s) over t ∈ V ∗
or over t ∈ V+, A(t) uniquely determines the virtual payments as the only truthful, normalized
and monotone payments. Conversely, the virtual payments determine the allocation A(t) up to
tie-breaking.
Proof. For every V ∗ it is well-known that the payments P12, P1, P2, P∅ uniquely determine
the truthful allocation up to tie-breaking, since the allocation maximizes Pα − tα over α ∈
{12, 1, 2, ∅}.
We prove the uniqueness of monotone, normalized, truthful payments for a given allocations
function A(t). By definition, P∅ = 0 must hold. We claim that, if R1 = ∅, then P1 = 0 must be
the case. Assume the contrary, then by monotonicity, P1 > 0 must hold. However, if P1 > 0,
then the points t = (t1 < P1, t2 = L, t12 = t1 + L) ∈ V+ ⊂ V ∗ (for large enough L) are in R1,
(by truthfulness) contradicting R1 = ∅. If R1 6= ∅, then P1 = sup{t1 | (t1, L, t1 + L) ∈ R1} is
uniquely determined by A(t). (Note that the supremum cannot be infinite, otherwise R∅ = ∅
would hold.) By symmetric argument, also P2 is uniquely determined by A(t).
Consider now P12. We claim that, if R12 = ∅, then P12 = max{P1, P2, 0} must be the case
(these are unique by the paragraph above). Assume the contrary, that P12 > max{P1, P2, 0}.
Then, for every small enough  > 0 the t = (, , 2) ∈ V+ ⊂ V ∗ must be a point in R12,
contradicting R12 = ∅. Finally, if R12 6= ∅, then (0, 0, 0) ∈ R12 and R12 must have boundary
points t with at least one of R∅, or R1 or R2, given that R∅ 6= ∅. If R12 has a boundary with
(say) R1, then P12−P1 = sup{t2 | (0, t2, t2) ∈ R12}, because this point (i.e., with the supremum
t2 value) must be on the boundary with R1. If R12 has no common boundary with R1 or R2,
then P12 = sup{t2 | (0, t2, t2) ∈ R12}, because this point must be on the boundary with R∅.
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B.3.2 One-to-one correspondence of allocation and virtual payments
The virtual payments determine the allocation so that critical values for a bid getting/losing a
task (for fixed other bids) are always non-negative.11 Exploiting this, it simplifies the discussion
that we can assume that the closure of each of the 4 allocation regions of the t-player is always
nonempty (over V ∗ or V+) : if for some t ∈ R3≥0 an allocation (say 12) does not contradict
truthfulness for the virtual payments, then we assume that t is in the closure of the respective
allocation region (say t ∈ R12). For example, w.l.o.g. (0, 0, 0) ∈ R12, and (0, L, L) ∈ R1 for large
enough L always hold, because P12 is the largest payment, and P1 is nonnegative.
12 In the
proofs we always pick bids t from the interior of some allocation region (here the allocation is
uniquely determined), so the above assumption is without loss of generality.
Claim 6 has a crucial, and maybe surprising implication concerning a one-to-one relation
between WMON allocations A(t) over t ∈ V ∗ and their respective restrictions to the additive
plane A|V+ .
Lemma 15. For every WMON allocation function A(t) over t ∈ V ∗ (in particular for the
allocation function A[s] for arbitrary fixed s), and its restriction to the additive plane A+ := A|V+
hold that A uniquely determines A+, and conversely, up to tie-breaking A+ uniquely determines
A over V ∗. Moreover the virtual payments P12, P1, P2, P∅ are the same for A as for A+.
Proof. The first statement, that A determines A|V+ , is obvious. Since the payments for A are
normalized, monotone, and truthful for A+, by uniqueness these are the only possible virtual
payments for A+.
We show how the other implication (that A+ determines A) also follows from the uniqueness
of the normalized and monotone payments. Suppose that there exist two different WMON
allocation functions over V ∗, A′(t) and A′′(t), such that A+(t) = A′|V+(t) = A′′|V+(t) for
every t ∈ V+. By Claim 6 there exist unique virtual payments P ′ = (P ′12, P ′1, P ′2, P ′∅, ) and
P 2 = (P ′′12, P ′′1 , P ′′2 , P ′′∅ , ), i.e., truthful, normalized and monotone payments for A
′ and A′′,
respectively. Obviously, both are truthful, normalized and monotone for the allocation function
A+(t), when restricted to V+. SinceA+ has unique truthful, normalized and monotone payments,
by Claim 6, it must be the case that P ′12 = P ′′12, P ′1 = P ′′1 , P ′2 = P ′′2 , and P ′∅ = P
′′
∅ . This, in turn,
implies by the same claim applied on V ∗ that A′ ≡ A′′ up to tie-breaking, which concludes the
proof.
B.3.3 Illustration
We provide a geometric illustration to Lemma 15. For fixed s, the allocation function to the
t-player A(t1, t2, t12) has a very simple geometric representation in R3≥0.
Consider the (closures of the) four allocation regions of the t-player in V : R12, R1, R2, R∅.
By truthfulness, these regions are uniquely determined by the three payments as follows:
R∅ = {t ∈ V | t1 ≥ P1, t2 ≥ P2, t12 ≥ P12},
R1 = {t ∈ V | t1 ≤ P1, t1 ≤ t12 + P1 − P12, t1 ≤ t2 + P1 − P2},
R2 = {t ∈ V | t2 ≤ P2, t2 ≤ t12 + P2 − P12, t2 ≤ t1 + P2 − P1},
R12 = {t ∈ V | t12 ≤ P12, t12 ≤ t1 + P12 − P1, t12 ≤ t2 + P12 − P2}.
The boundaries between pairs of these regions, if exist, must be subsets of the following planes,
respectively:
{t ∈ V | t1 = P1} (R1|R∅)
11In geometric terms, axis-parallel boundaries always have position at least 0.
12Mind that the closure of a region Rα defined this way is not the topological closure of the respective interior
Rα, e.g., if Rα is empty.
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{t ∈ V | t2 = P2} (R2|R∅)
{t ∈ V | t12 = P12} (R12|R∅)
{t ∈ V | t12 − t1 = P12 − P1} (R12|R1)
{t ∈ V | t12 − t2 = P12 − P2} (R12|R2)
{t ∈ V | t1 − t2 = P1 − P2} (R2|R1).
All these planes have the common intersection point (P1, P2, P12). By monotonicity of the virtual
payments, this common point is in the domain V of monotone valuations, and it is a boundary
point of all four regions in V. Moreover these boundaries always exist in V (not only their
planes). Their positions determine the allocation and the payments and vice-versa. The four
regions in V ⊂ R3≥0, of a general WMON allocation have thus a rather simple and visible
structure.
Let us now consider the additive plane V+; this plane always intersects the first two bound-
aries (R1|R∅ and R2|R∅), so that the allocation on the additive plane uniquely determines P1
and P2. Finally, always at least one of the third, fourth and fifth boundaries intersects (as
boundary) the additive plane V+, which determines P12.
In particular, as can be seen from the proof of Lemma 15, the interior of a region Rα of the
t-player is empty in V+ if and only if it is empty in V (and consequently, if and only if it is
empty in V ∗, since V+ ⊂ V ∗). This may seem surprising, since it could in principle have been
the case that the additive plane V+ does not intersect some nonempty region Rα ⊂ V.
B.3.4 Extending the additive characterization to V ∗ × V+,B
In what follows, we characterize all truthful mechanisms for two tasks and two bidders with
valuations on the domains V ×V+,B, Vsubmod ×V+,B, V×V+,B, and (V∩Vsubmod )×V+,B based
on the characterization on V+ × V+,B. According to Theorem 4, every truthful mechanism on
V+ × V+,B is one of the following four types: (1) relaxed affine minimizer, (2) relaxed task-
independent mechanism, (3) 1-dimensional mechanism, (4) constant mechanism.
Let A be some WMON allocation on V ∗×V+,B for V ∗ ∈ {V, Vsubmod , V, Vsubmod ∩V}. (these
are the allocations to be characterized). Its restriction A|V+×V+,B to additive valuations of the
t-player is a WMON allocation for additive valuations, and therefore is of one of the types (1) to
(4) above. Let A|V+×V+,B be for instance a (relaxed) affine minimizer. Then, for every s ∈ V+,B
the allocation and payments for the t-player on t ∈ V+ are those of this affine minimizer. By
uniqueness (Lemma 15), they extend to t ∈ V ∗ uniquely to be the allocation and payments
of the same affine minimizer. This, in turn, means that for every fixed t ∈ V ∗ the s-player
on s ∈ V+,B has allocation and payments according to this affine minimizer. Altogether the
mechanism on V ∗ × V+,B is the same affine minimizer, with the same parameters, and same
virtual payments as on V+ × V+,B. The argument is analogous for 1-dimensional mechanisms
and for constant mechanisms. On the other hand, for relaxed task independent mechanisms we
show next that these are not extendable to V ∗×V+,B, (in particular, not even to V×V+,B(!)),
except for those that are at the same time affine minimizers or 1-dimensional mechanisms.
B.3.5 (A,P )|V+×V+,B is a (relaxed) task-independent mechanism
A relaxed task-independent mechanism allocates the two tasks by independent 1-dimensional
WMON allocations, up to (s1, s2) (resp. (t1, t2)) points where the critical value functions φ() and
η() of both of these mechanisms have a jump discontinuity. Since there are at most countably
many s1, s2, t1, and t2 where these increasing functions of the 1-dimensional mechanisms can
have a jump, it will be easy to handle these s and t values in the following discussion. We
assume that the inverse of an increasing function φ is constant over intervals where the original
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function has a jump, and conversely, the inverse φ−1 has a jump discontinuity in c, and φ−1(c)
is defined in an arbitrary monotone way, when the original function is constant c over some
interval.
Assume that on V+× V+,B the payments to the t-player, according to the task-independent
mechanism are
P1(s) = φ(s1), P2(s) = η(s2), P12(s) = φ(s1) + η(s2),
where φ and η are arbitrary non-negative increasing functions over s1, s2 ∈ [0, B). We can
assume that the values of φ and η are finite, because R∅ = ∅ would hold for the t-player in every
point (s1, s2) where φ(s1) =∞, or η(s2) =∞.
By Lemma 15, the same payments to the t-player hold over t ∈ V ∗.
In what follows, we consider the allocation and payments to the s-player on V ∗ × V+,B for
some carefully chosen t ∈ V ∩ Vsubmod ⊂ V ∗ values, and will conclude that the mechanism
is truthful only if Φ ≡ 0 or η ≡ 0 (implying a 1-dimensional mechanism), or if φ and η are
both linear by the same multiplicative constant, which corresponds to a task-independent affine
minimizer.13
We use the notation φ(B) = lims1→B− φ(s1) and η(B) = lims2→B− η(s2), furthermore φ(0) =
lims1→0+ φ(s1) and η(0) = lims2→0+ η(s2).
The case when φ(0) = φ(B), and η(0) = η(B), yields a constant mechanism. The cases
when φ(0) = φ(B) = 0 or η(0) = η(B) = 0 correspond to 1-dimensional mechanisms. The case
when φ(0) = φ(B) = C > 0 (or η(0) = η(B) = C > 0) on V+ × V+,B is a task-independent
mechanism that allocates one of the tasks by a constant mechanism, independently of the bid s.
We sketch a proof that the latter mechanisms do not extend to V ∗×V+,B when C > 0. Assume
the contrary that φ ≡ C > 0. Then for the payments
P∅ = 0, P1 ≡ C, P2 = η(s2), P12 = η(s2) + C
must hold, even on V ∗ × V+,B. This implies that even for every t ∈ V ∗ in the extension, the
allocation is independent of s1. That is, for every t ∈ V ∗ the allocation to the s-player either
consists of a single region, or has a single horizontal boundary. However, the above payments
to the t-player imply that if φ(s1) ≡ C > 0 and η(s2) takes on at least two different values, then
there exists a t ∈ V ∗ so that for this fixed t, by increasing s2, the allocation to the s-player gets
from Rs2(t) into R
s
1(t) (and this happens even for every s1). However, the s-player cannot have
a nonempty Rs2(t) and R
s
1(t) regions at the same time, if it only has horizontal boundaries, a
contradiction.
In the rest of this subsection we assume φ(0) < φ(B) and η(0) < η(B).
Definition 22. We will say that
- t1 > 0 is valid, if t1 ∈ (φ(0), φ(B)), and φ−1 is well-defined (continuous) in the point t1;
- t2 > 0 is valid, if t2 ∈ (η(0), η(B)), and η−1 is well-defined (continuous) in the point t2;
- t = (t1, t2, t12) ∈ V is valid, if each of t1, t′1 = t12 − t2, t2, and t′2 = t12 − t1 are valid.
Observe that almost all14 t1 ∈ (φ(0), φ(B)) and almost all t2 ∈ (η(0), η(B)) are valid,
because the increasing functions φ−1 and η−1 have a jump-discontinuity in at most countably
many points. Moreover, if t1 and t2 are valid, then the point (t1, t2, t1 + t2) ∈ V+ is valid, and
for all ′ < , the points (t1, t2, t1 + t2 − ′) are in V ∩ Vsubmod , and they are valid for almost
all ′. It follows that the set of all valid t points is dense in V ∩ Vsubmod , at least if we restrict
13A task-independent affine minimizer minimizes among t12, t1 +µs2 +γ1, µs1 + t2 +γ2, µ(s1 +s2)+γ1 +γ2
for some given constants µ, γ1, γ2.
14meaning: ’except for a countable subset’
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attention to t1 ∈ (φ(0) + ′, φ(B) − ′). Our goal is to show that the restriction of φ−1 to the
valid points of (φ(0) + ′, φ(B)− ′) is identical to a linear function, and analogously for t2 and
η−1; moreover φ−1 and η−1 have the same slope. Thus, since a restriction of each of φ and η to a
dense subset is linear, and they are increasing, in fact, they cannot have jump discontinuities at
all, and are (allover) linear functions with the same slope. Finally, by taking ′ → 0, we obtain
linearity over (φ(0), φ(B)), and (η(0), η(B)) respectively. This will prove that A|V+×V+,B is a
task-independent affine minimizer, and A is necessarily the same affine minimizer on V ∗×V+,B.
First we argue that for all valid t the regions Rs∅(t) ⊂ V+ and Rs1(t) ⊂ V+ are nonempty, in
particular there exist s ∈ V+,B on the boundary of these two regions. Since Rs∅(t) is nonempty,
for valid t the virtual payments P sα(t) of the s-player are well-defined. Further, an s on the
boundary will help us to obtain a formula for P s1 (t).
Consider an arbitrary fixed valid t ∈ V. Since t2 < η(B), there exist s ∈ V+,B so that
t2 < η(s2), or equivalently η
−1(t2) < s2. For every such s and the fixed t, the t-player receives
task 2. Moreover, since η−1 is continuous in t2, the same holds (there exist proper s2 values
globally) for all points in some neighborhood of t. Now, for every such s, the s is on the boundary
of Rs∅ and R
s
1, iff our fixed point t is on the boundary of R12(s) and R2(s).
15 On the other hand,
s is on the boundary of Rs∅ and R
s
1, iff s1 = P
s
1 (here we use that s can not get task 2), and t is
on the boundary of R12(s) and R2(s) iff t12 − t2 = P12(s) − P2(s) = φ(s1). Observe that such
an s1 does exist, given that t12 − t2 is valid, i.e. is within the range of valid t1 values and is a
continuity point of φ−1. In summary, for the fixed valid t, and the found s it must hold that
P s1 (t) = s1 = φ
−1(t12 − t2),
which, for any valid t yields the formula for P s1 (t) independently of s. Analogously, we obtain
for valid t that
P s2 (t) = η
−1(t12 − t1).
Next we determine P s12 in two different ways for every valid t. First of all we claim that if t is
valid then Rs12(t) is nonempty. Indeed, by the validity of t, there exist s such that s1 < φ
−1(t1),
and s2 < η
−1(t2), and s2 < η−1(t12 − t1). For all such s it holds that t1 > φ(s1) = P1(s), and
t2 > η(s2) = P2(s), and t12 > η(s2) + t1 > η(s2) + φ(s1) = P12(s). Therefore t ∈ R∅(s). This
implies that the (open) set of all such s must belong to R12(t).
Second, we claim that there exists an s′ on the boundary of Rs12(t) and Rs2(t), and another s′′
on the boundary of Rs12(t) and R
s
1(t). Indeed, let s
′ be such that s′1 = φ−1(t1), and s′2 < η−1(t2),
and s′2 < η−1(t12−t1). Then, t2 > η(s′2) = P2(s′), and t12 > η(s′2)+t1 = η(s′2)+φ(s′1) = P12(s′),
so the t-player does not get task 2 even with a bid in a small enough neighborhood of t, and
because of t1 = φ(s
′
1) it must be on the boundary of R1(s
′) and R∅(s′), so s′ is on the boundary
of Rs2(t) and R
s
12(t) (here we use that s
′
1 is uniquely defined as φ
−1(t1)). The proof is analogous
for s′′.
By the position of s′,
P s12 − P s2 = s′1 = φ−1(t1);
the second equality follows from the fact that for s′ the t must be on the boundary of R∅ and
R1. Plugging in P
s
2 we obtain (using also that φ
−1 and η−1 are well-defined in t)
P s12 = φ
−1(t1) + η−1(t12 − t1).
On the other hand, using s′′ we obtain by analogous argument that
P s12 = η
−1(t2) + φ−1(t12 − t2).
This yields that
φ−1(t1) + η−1(t12 − t1) = η−1(t2) + φ−1(t12 − t2)
15In fact, the boundary of the t-player is allowed to have a jump in s1 = φ
−1(t1).
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for every valid t.
Let ′ < . Assume for a moment that all t ∈ V∩Vsubmod with t1 ∈ (φ(0)+ ′, φ(B)− ′) and
t2 ∈ (η(0)+ ′, η(B)− ′) are valid, and consider such a t. Increasing now only t1 by an arbitrary
positive δ < ′, the right side of the last equality does not change. This is possible only if φ−1(t1)
and η−1(t12 − t1) increases, resp. decreases by the same value ∆ := φ−1(t1 + δ) − φ−1(t1) =
η−1(t12 − t1)− η−1(t12 − t1 − δ).
Now fix t1, t2 and δ (thereby fixing ∆), and consider every t12 ∈ (t1 + t2 − ′, t1 + t2). For
every such t12 holds by the same argument η
−1(t12 − t1)− η−1(t12 − t1 − δ) = ∆ with the fixed
∆. The last statement can be rewritten as η−1(x)− η−1(x− δ) = ∆ for every x ∈ (t2 − ′, t2).
Now taking δ/2r instead of δ and letting r →∞, by the monotonicity of η−1 this implies that
η−1 must be linear on the interval (t2 − ′, t2). (The proof of this is analogous to the proof of
Lemma 11.)
As a final step, change t2 to an arbitrary other valid t
′
2. Here again, by the same argument
η−1 is linear over (t′2 − ′, t′2). Since such overlapping open intervals cover the interval (η(0) +
′, η(B) − ′), the function η−1 must be a single linear function over (η(0) + ′, η(B) − ′). By
taking the limit ′ → 0 we obtain that φ−1 is linear over (η(0), η(B)). By symmetric argument,
φ−1 is linear, too, and φ−1 and η−1 have the same multiplicative constant ∆/δ as follows from
∆ = φ−1(t1 + δ)− φ−1(t1) = η−1(t12 − t1)− η−1(t12 − t1 − δ).
Now, how do we go around non-valid points t ∈ V ∩ Vsubmod? By counting arguments it
can be shown that the grid of rational (t1, t2) pairs can be translated by a real vector, so
that all translated pairs are valid. After this, a real δ can be found so that every corresponding
(t1, t2, t1+ t2−δ ·k/2r) is valid, too. Using only these numbers we obtain that φ and η are linear
on the translated rational grid, so given that they are monotone increasing, they must be linear
functions allover. This concludes the proof that the allocation function is a task-independent
affine minimizer on V ∗ × V+,B.
B.3.6 Mechanisms with high approximation ratio
We proved above that any truthful mechanism (A,P ) on V ∗ × V+,B is (1) relaxed affine min-
imizer, (2) a one-dimensional mechanism, or (3) a constant mechanism. It remains to prove
that in cases (2), and (3), the approximation ratio is high. This will conclude the proof of
Theorem 5.
Lemma 16. If (A,P ) on V ∗×V+,B is a one-dimensional mechanism, or a constant mechanism,
there exists an instance for which the makespan of A is at least
√
B and the approximation ratio
is at least
√
B.
Proof. Assume first that A is a constant mechanism. By the assumption that R∅(s) 6= ∅ for
every s, it must be the case that the constant mechanism is independent of s.
If, for t = (
√
B,
√
B) at least one of the tasks is given to the t-player, then the makespan is
2
√
B and the approximation ratio is unbounded, because s can be chosen arbitrarily small. If
for t = (
√
B,
√
B) both tasks are given to the s-player, then we can choose s = (B,B) to prove
approximation ratio of at least
√
B.
Assume now that A is a bundling allocation, and consider the input (t1 =
√
B, t2 = 0, s1 =
0, s2 =
√
B). Either both tasks are given to the t-player, or both are given to the s-player, so
the makespan is
√
B and the approximation ratio is unbounded.
Finally, assume w.l.o.g., that A realizes only the two allocations αt = ∅, or αt = 1. Then set
s2 =
√
B, and t1 = t2 = 0. Since the s-player must receive task 2, the approximation is again
unbounded.
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